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COMPELLING TREATMENT IN THE
COMMUNITY: DISTORTED DOCTRINES
AND VIOLATED VALUES*
Steven . Schwartz**
Cathy E. Costanzo***
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilised community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physi-
cal or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opin-
ions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.'
But the existence of such laws has passed away with the
narrow views which produced them; and the improved knowl-
edge of the present day, on the subject of mental alienation,
would not tolerate a course of treatment which was once
deemed not only judicious, but a measure of absolute necessity.
It has been impressively and eloquently said, that every man is
interested in this subject; for no man can reckon on the contin-
uance of his perfect reason. Disease may weaken, accident may
disturb, anxiety may impair it; and if every departure from
sound mind may subject the person so affected to an indiscrimi-
nate treatment, including deprivation of property and liberty,
no man can be sure that he may not, with a full consciousness
* This Article is dedicated to Mary Crapo who was committed to providing people with
choices and whose determined spirit would be offended by any form of coerced treatment.
** Director, Center for Public Representation, Northampton, Massachusetts; Lecturer on
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Law.
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of his suffering and wrongs, be one day treated as if all sense
and feeling in him were destroyed and lost; torn from his fam-
ily, from his home, from his innocent but eccentric pursuits
2
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I. INTRODUCTION
We have inherited a history of confining people with mental disabili-
ties and depriving them of the ordinary rights of citizenship, allegedly for
their own good. The establishment of places to care for those labeled
2. Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526, 533 (1842) (quoting CONOLLY'S INDICATIONS OF IN-
SANITY 8).
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"disordered" has traditionally followed periods of increased awareness of
their suffering. These phases of "reforms" were quite literally institution-
alized through systems which usually prioritized care over freedom,
cures over preferences and compulsion over consent. Civil commitment
was and continues to be the legal rubric that sanctions this offer of gener-
osity which cannot be refused.
This history can be traced to at least the fourth century B.C., when
the first sanitorium was built in Greece in response to a burgeoning inter-
est in curing afflictions of the mind.3 For the next two thousand years,
society's concern for people branded as "lunatics"4 was primarily limited
to those with means. The poor were left alone. When the disturbance of
their differences or the threat of their presence became too great, the
poor were herded to almshouses, jails or simply the edge of town.5 In the
nineteenth century, another wave of concern produced new buildings
solely for housing people with mental illness.6 These segregated environ-
ments offered so much promise of improvement that legislatures enacted
statutes to ensure that the offer was accepted. Subsequently, the author-
ity to compel care was expanded considerably, so that the promise of
unproven treatments could be provided to all in apparent need.7
3. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 9
(3d ed. 1985); see also BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMI-
CIDE 3-34 (1955).
4. The word was officially first used in the statute De Praerogativa Regis which was en-
acted in England between 1255 and 1290. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
473 (7th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW *464
(1959). This law was intended to distinguish a lunatic as a person "who hath understanding,
but . . . hath lost the use of his reason" from one who "hath no understanding from his
nativity." S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 10. Today the labels "men-
tally ill" and "mentally retarded" serve the same misguided purpose.
5. See generally A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR
CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES (1949). The situation apparently was simi-
lar in Europe. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 12-13; MADHOUSES,
MAD-DOCTORS, AND MADMEN 166-92 (A. Scull ed. 1981).
6. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 13-16; A. DEUTSCH, supra note
5, at 114-15, 186-87. Dorothea Dix was the champion of this capital construction campaign in
America. Although the development of places to keep people and methods to improve them
has been uneven during the millenium, the pace has accelerated dramatically over the past two
centuries. Similarly, the locations where those labeled mentally infirm are confined increased
exponentially, as measured by either the number, capacity, or design of these environments.
Within the walls of these places, technological innovations and institutional order combined to
create an impressive list of deprivations which were routinely imposed on individual residents;
they ranged from mind-altering surgeries to a modified version of an infant's high chair that
had bed sheets tie the person in. This latter device is still common on most wards of today's
mental hospitals where elderly persons are confined.
7. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 15-16. By 1960, virtually every
state in the nation had passed laws authorizing the involuntary confinement and treatment of
people with mental disabilities who were determined to "need treatment." See Developments
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As these facilities became too full and embarassingly inadequate by
the mid-twentieth century, 8 another expression of concern arose which
blended psychiatry's promise of cure through drugs, the law's guarantee
of dignity through process and a mental health policy of care through
community services. 9 When critics later labeled this latest expression an
uncompassionate failure, 10 a new wave of proposals to confine people
emerged. The most far reaching of these is outpatient commitment,
sometimes termed involuntary community treatment.
Outpatient commitment is not a unified concept with a commonly
accepted definition or consequence. For this Article's purposes, it will be
defined as a judicial order, entered pursuant to a state's civil commitment
in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190, 1194-97 nn.ll-14
(1974) [hereinafter Developments].
8. The outcry was reflected in media exposes such as the noted one of the Willowbrook
Institution filmed by Geraldo Rivera. Willowbrook was a mammoth and embarassing retarda-
tion facility in Staten Island, New York. See D. ROTHMAN & S. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOW-
BROOK WARS 44-46 (1984). It was also documented in judicial findings. Wyatt v. Stickney,
334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974). Horrors of institutional life are not a recent
phenomenon; commentators for centuries have described the abuses routinely experienced by
inmates of large facilities. See generally A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES (1948).
Nineteenth century reformers, in their eagerness to save the mentally ill from the pain of
community exposure and social integration, merely ignored this reality.
9. The medical profession heralded the discovery of antipsychotic medications and
policymakers relied upon them as the clinical justification for depopulating state hospitals.
With the advent of these psychopharmacological drugs (e.g., bromides, barbituates, chlor-
promazine, meprobamate, reserpine and chloroxipide), mental illness could apparently be
treated outside of a hospital setting. See J. TALBOTT, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLUM 26 (1978).
Simultaneously, the legal profession awakened to the constitutional implications of involuntary
commitment, which entailed a "massive curtailment of liberty." Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 509 (1972). Successful litigation soon resulted in heightened standards of commitment
and expanded procedural safeguards. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F.
Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reaff'd, 413 F.
Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
Public officials both anticipated and followed these developments. President Kennedy
provided courageous leadership in urging passage of a federal initiative to encourage the crea-
tion of community mental health services. See Mental Retardation Facilities and Community
Mental Health Centers Construction Act, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963), repealed by
Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 560 (1981). Local legislators often needed to be
pressed by the courts. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); Brewster v.
Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F (E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978) (final consent decree), reprinted in 3
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 45 (1979), enforced, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass, 1982), affld as
modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st. Cir. 1986).
This history is well summarized in Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REv. 367, 388-400 (1983-84).
10. See Bachrach, An Overview of Deinstitutionalization, in DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 5,
10-13 (L. Bachrach ed. 1983); see also H. WILSON, DEINSTITUTIONALIZED RESIDENTIAL
CARE FOR THE MENTALLY DISORDERED 110-11 (1982); Myers, supra note 9, at 403.
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scheme, which compels a person to participate in mental health pro-
grams and to comply with a court-approved treatment regimen outside
of the walls of a mental institution. This understanding of the term has
been endorsed by leading judicial organizations
11 and commentators. 12
This may be the end of the consensus on the subject.
Proponents perceive outpatient commitment as the panacea for two
decades of abuse in deinstitutionalization policies and libertarian modifi-
cations to civil commitment standards. They present it as a sensible ap-
plication of the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative-a
constitutional principle used to analyze the legitimacy of governmental
restrictions on individual liberties which only recently has been applied
to civil commitment. 3 In the name of outpatient commitment, some
urge a modification of involuntary commitment standards to encompass
persons not presently dangerous or not dangerous at all, but who would
ultimately benefit from forced treatment. 14 Others suggest a radical ex-
pansion of the places where people are confined-from traditional insti-
tutions to community mental health residences or crisis shelters." The
reform promises that some people labeled mentally ill may not need to be
physically confined at all, provided they can be compelled to comply
with a treatment plan and conform their behavior to a clinically pre-
scribed norm. Thus, outpatient commitment's apparent attractiveness
lies in the expanded authority to require people with mental disorders
to accept psychiatric interventions without necessarily being
institutionalized.
Not surprisingly, critics of outpatient commitment disagree that it
will be any more of a successful cure than were massive institutions,
medication clinics or cold packs. 6 They point out that even the most
avid proponents cannot agree on what outpatient commitment means;
whether major statutory revisions in state law are necessary or desirable
11. See, e.g., INSTITUTE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE LAW & THE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, A MODEL FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ALTERNATIVE DOCTRINE IN INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT 363 (1984) [hereinafter
LRA REPORT]; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY
CIVIL COMMITMENT, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409, 497 (1986) [herein-
after COMMITMENT GUIDELINES].
12. Bleicher, Compulsory Community Care for the Mentally Ill, 16 CLEv. MARSHALL L.
REV. 93 (1967); Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54 (1982); Myers, supra note 9, at 418-19.
13. For a discussion of the principle and its application to the involuntary confinement of
mentally disabled persons, see infra notes 83-129 and accompanying text.
14. Myers, supra note 9, at 418-20, 427.
15. Bleicher, supra note 12; see also COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 512.
16. Morse, supra note 12, at 96.
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in order to accomplish its goals; whether compulsory community care is
feasible, considering the myriad of obstacles to its implementation; or if it
will achieve the desired outcomes, which are themselves unclear and
often contradictory.
For outpatient commitment to be clinically appropriate and politi-
cally acceptable, it will almost certainly require expanding the standards
for compulsory treatment beyond those which now determine involun-
tary institutionalization. This expansion is not only predictable, given
the public pressure for relaxed commitment criteria,' 7 but also inevitable,
since no one would easily tolerate the compelled attendance of dangerous
persons in local neighborhood mental health programs.' In fact, the
primary purpose of the entire outpatient commitment proposal is to coer-
cively intervene with psychiatric treatment before a person becomes dan-
gerous, unable to care for himself or otherwise subject to current state
laws for involuntary hospitalization.' 9 This is precisely what has hap-
pened in states which have adopted a comprehensive outpatient
scheme.2°
17. The psychiatric profession has long been critical of current commitment requirements
and has advocated a lowering of the threshhold for involuntary treatment. See Chodoff, The
Case for Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally 111, 133 AM. 3. PSYCHIATRY 496 (1976);
Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 275 (1983). Legal scholars rest their case for outpatient commitment as much on
the benefits of these broader criteria as on the attractiveness of treatment in noninstitutional
programs. See Bleicher, supra note 12, at 103; Myers, supra note 9, at 427-28. But all com-
mentators and public policy observers recognize the reality that the current trend to authorize
coerced community care almost invariably incorporates a modified commitment standard. See
Bursten, Posthospital Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1255 (1986);
Miller & Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environ-
ment?, 35 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 147, 149 (1984); I. Keilitz, Involuntary Outpa-
tient Civil Commitment 33, 42 (1986) (unpublished manuscript available from the Institute on
Mental Disability and the Law, National Center for State Courts); J. Owens, Involuntary Out-
patient Commitment 34 (Nov. 1985) (unpublished paper prepared for the National Institute of
Mental Health, Division of Educational Services Systems Liaison).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 275-78.
19. See Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in
Procedural, Substantive and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 100-02 (1986); Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17; Editorial, Outpatient Commit-
ment: The Problems and the Promise, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1270 (1986) [hereinafter Edito-
rial]. Under this professed humanitarian concern to force treatment as a response to
psychological deterioration, outpatient commitment has rapidly become the vehicle for rather
radical modifications to substantive civil commitment standards.
20. Six states-Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, North Carolina and Tennessee-have
recently enacted statutes which authorize involuntary community care. Each includes a sub-
stantial modification of institutional commitment standards. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-1415(c),
1409 (Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-81 (Harrison Supp. 1985); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 334-127(b) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2918(a) (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-
263(d)(1) (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-104 (Supp. 1986). See Keilitz & Hall, State
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To pursue this questionable reform in the name of the parens patriae
and least restrictive alternative principles is to distort those doctrines and
to violate their underlying values. Conversely, to respect these legal re-
straints on governmental power and maintain current commitment crite-
ria would avoid the conceptual difficulties of involuntary community
treatment. As a practical matter, however, it might leave few people ac-
tually eligible, in the eyes of local judges and neighbors, for release from
state institutions and forced participation in community mental health
services. 1 If outpatient commitment does not widen the net-as .it most
surely will-there may be no one to catch in the beneficent paternalism
of coerced community care.
We may be on the verge of making another monumental mistake in
our zeal to care for, protect and fix those whom we label mentally ill.
Outpatient commitment is neither conceptually correct nor practicably
feasible. This Article takes the position that involuntary community
treatment is a flawed idea which will benefit few and may harm many.
Part II examines the legal justification for civilly restraining people la-
belled mentally ill to further their own welfare, which forms the theoreti-
cal foundation for outpatient commitment. Part III analyzes the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative to determine whether coerced
community care is a proper application of this constitutional precept.
Part IV surveys current state law on outpatient commitment, both statu-
tory requirements and judicial decisions, based upon a comprehensive
study by the National Center on State Courts. Part V identifies several
practical obstacles to the implementation of involuntary community
treatment. Of particular significance is whether outpatient commitment
is feasible absent a system of community mental health services (the real-
ity in most jurisdictions) or whether it is necessary in the presence of
such a system, as exemplified in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts
model is described in Part VI. Finally, some conclusions are presented
concerning the probable consequences of expanding the civil commit-
ment network into our neighborhoods and communities.
Statutes Governing Involuntary Outpatient Civil Commitment, 9 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DisA-
BILrrY L. REP. 378 (1985).
A detailed analysis of each state's outpatient commitment statute is set forth infra in the
Appendix. The charts were prepared by the Institute on Mental Disability and the Law of the
National Center on State Courts. They represent the most comprehensive comparison to date
of the provisions in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that sanction the forcible
treatment of people in noninstitutional settings.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 252-56.
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II. THE STATE'S AUTHORITY TO CONFINE OR COMMIT
A. Development of the State's Parens Patriae Authority
Cases and commentators regularly point to two justifications for
civil commitment-the state's police power and itsparenspatriae author-
ity.22 The former is primarily limited to protecting the safety and welfare
of the community and preventing harm to third persons.23 For several
centuries, it provided the only justification for confining people labeled
mentally ill.24 From feudal times through the development of the com-
mon law in colonial America, the fundamental right of physical freedom
could only be denied to those considered mentally ill if they posed a sub-
stantial danger to others. Neither the king nor subsequent state govern-
ments could involuntarily confine handicapped persons except to protect
the community from harm. Thus, while the needs and limitations of dis-
22. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on procedural grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S.
957 (1975), reaff'd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). See Dix, Major Current Issues Con-
cerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (Summer 1982); La
Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REv.
499 (1981); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968) [hereinafter Livermore]; Morse, supra note 12; Myers, supra note 9;
Developments, supra note 7.
23. There is some disagreement with respect to the relevance of this authority to prevent
injury to the mentally ill individual. Some writers argue that commitment to prevent danger to
self, attempted through intentional, self-destructive acts or inadvertence, is an expression of
society's responsibility to prevent harm to its members and therefore an exercise of the police
power. See Hermann, supra note 19, at 94-95; La Fond, supra note 22, at 501 n.9. This view
has considerable support in history, see S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, and
has been accepted implicitly by the United States Supreme Court. See Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). Others reason that any action to protect an incompetent individual
is more properly taken under the state's parens patriae authority. Developments, supra note 7,
at 1223-28; see also Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085. But even this second approach makes a
sharp distinction between parens patriae interventions to ensure the individual's physical
safety-a well established societal obligation that was transferred from its original police
power foundation-and actions to improve the person's health or welfare-a recent innovation
that is grounded on a questionable view of governmental responsibility. State commitment
statutes almost uniformly include a standard authorizing confinement for the former, usually
under the terms "danger to self" and "gravely disabled," but only a few jurisdictions allow
involuntary institutionalization for the latter. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra
note 3, at 114-21 table 2.6.
24. In England, the Crown had the absolute privilege to restrain violent persons who also
happened to "fail of their wit." S. BRAKEL, 3. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 10, 12-
14. This authority was incorporated in the common law. See A. DEUTSCH, supra note 5, at
419-20. Statutes translating this common-law power to colonial authorities appeared in Mas-
sachusetts as early as 1676. 5 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 77 (N. Shurtleffed. 1854). By the late eighteenth century,
many of the original states had enacted similar provisions. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEI-
NER, supra note 3, at 14.
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abled persons may have been widely ignored by public authorities,25 their
liberty interests were not.26 This police power rationale still forms the
principal basis for most state commitment statutes.27 But because it is
directed towards detaining dangerous persons in secure settings, it has
little relevance to outpatient commitment.
The parens patriae authority extends the mantle of government pro-
tection, and its authority to commit, to incompetent persons who pose a
danger to themselves.2" Compelling mental health treatment in commu-
nity settings does not represent a legitimate exercise of this power since it
is commonly undertaken not to protect a dangerous, incompetent person
from physical harm, but instead to ensure that a competent individual
receives coerced treatment outside of an institution.29 The extraordinary
extension of theparenspatriae power implied in most outpatient commit-
ment proposals is neither consistent with its historical purpose and com-
mon law development nor supported by any compelling state interest
sufficient to override the fundamental rights at stake. Legal proponents
have had to distort its foundation and misinterpret two hundred years of
sparse case references to claim a theoretical justification for compulsory
25. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 10-12; A. DEUTSCH, supra note
5, at 123-25.
26. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *304 (1885). Stat-
utes including standards for dangerousness were promulgated as early as the sixteenth century.
See supra note 24. Even up to the mid-nineteenth century, some courts still resisted the notion
that restrictions on a person's liberty could be imposed solely because of the alleged insanity:
[S]uch an authority is possessed by no person, unless under the sanctions, and after
compliance with the forms, of law. No relationship, however near; no ties of friend-
ship, however close, between the lunatic and his keeper, would render the existence
of such a rule consistent with the safety of the community. Every cage would be a
licensed private mad-house; and, added to the nameless and unimaginable horrors
which have been brought to light in such establishments in England, even under the
treatment of medical men, and regulated by acts of parliament, would be the further
evil, that each individual keeper would be irresponsible. Any citizen could confine
his neighbor, provided only he were insane; and if the confinement were to continue
as long as the insanity, both would probably end only with the life of the patient;
imprisonment in a cage not being supposed to be the most efficacious mode of restor-
ing an insane man to his reason.
Colby v. Jackson, 12 N.H. 526, 532 (1842).
27. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 114-21 table 2.6, col. 4;
Hermann, supra note 19, at 94 n.60 (summarizing state statutes). For an earlier list, see Devel-
opments, supra note 7, at 1203 n. 11.
28. The stat's responsibility to protect the safety and financial interests of its incapable
citizens is a vague though long-standing aim of government. Developments, supra note 7, at
1207-09. Its origins in English law reflected a "concern for the property of the disabled, with
little attention given to his person." S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 10.
29. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 497-99 guideline G2 and commentary;
Miller & Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of the 1979
Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L. Rev. 985, 1019-20 (1982) [hereinafter Commitment in North
Carolina]; Myers, supra note 9, at 418-19.
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community care.30
The development of this parens patriae authority is hardly extensive
or well-conceived. It can be traced to the power of the English Crown to
safeguard the property interests of individuals deemed to be incompetent
or insane.31 As the protector of his wards' estates, the king was obligated
to exercise his authority to ensure only that no material harm was done.
This responsibility differed depending on whether the handicapped per-
son was labeled a "lunatic" or an "idiot."'32 The Crown could temporar-
ily manage the property of "lunatics" as long as they remained disabled.
All funds had to be applied to their daily expenses. For "idiots," how-
ever, the Crown could retain the profits from their property, after devot-
ing an appropriate amount to "necessaries." 33 Implicit in this broader
power was the permanent responsbility for the welfare of its retarded
wards. Thus theparenspatriae doctrine established the king as no more
than a temporary trustee over the property of people labeled mentally ill.
Safeguarding their health-to say nothing of confining their persons-
was unheard of.
34
This majestical concern with property was transported to the Amer-
30. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring);
Hermann, supra note 19, at 94. To argue that the dramatic expansion of the parens patriae
authority which occurred in this country from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury was a natural evolution true to "the beneficient purposes underlying the doctrine" is
simply incorrect. Myers, supra note 9, at 387-88. The better view of history and constitutional
authority can be found in Morse, supra note 12.
It ultimately required a virtual avalanche of federal court decisions to stem this expan-
sionist tide and return theparenspatriae commitment to a dangerousness standard. Colyar v.
Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (D. Utah 1979); Stamus v. Leonhardt,
414 F. Supp. 439, 450-51 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1121-24
(D. Haw. 1976), modified sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-10 (D. Haw.
1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 617 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1980); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 417-19 (W.D.
Ky. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093-94.
3 1. Originally, the lord of the fief was both master of his serfs and trustee of their assets if
they became of "unsound mind." 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 473. It was the lords'
abuse of this power and disregard for their serfs' welfare that forced the Crown to assume this
responsbility. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *304-05. Thus, from its inception, the
parens patriae doctrine was a limited grant of governmental authority, necessitated by the
excessive control and irresponsible actions of the guardians of disabled persons.
32. The current fascination with categorizing people with handicaps had an earlier origin.
See supra note 4 for a definition of these terms with their modem counterparts.
33. The king's responsibility was codified in the statute De Praerogativa Regis. S. BRAKEL,
J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 10. For a thorough review of the English history of
this doctrine, see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 4, at *481. A well-referenced
summary can be found in Myers, supra note 9, at 380-84.
34. Judge Neeley made this point forcefully and convincingly in a scholarly review of the
parenspatriae doctrine in State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 157 W. Va. 417, 427-30, 202 S.E.2d
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ican colonies via the common law. Subsequently, the authority was
vested in legislatures which enacted guardianship mechanisms to oversee
the interest of minors, incompetents and persons otherwise incapaci-
tated. 5 Even the more expansive expressions of the parens patriae au-
thority were originally confined to financial matters. For instance, in
Rebecca Owings' Case,36 the Maryland Court of Chancery obviously
strained to construct a rationale for protecting the property interests of a
woman labeled mentally ill who was due, but was being denied, a portion
of her inheritance.3 7 The court simultaneously acknowledged that this
authority could never sanction the confinement or control of the person.
Related decisions focused exclusively on money management.3 8 Rather
than representing an extension of the parens patriae power, as is some-
times contended,39 these early cases merely reaffirmed the traditional
109, 117-20 (1974). There is little support, in case law or commentary, for implying great
humanitarian purposes to the original concept.
As Praerogativa Regis is basically a tax statute clarifying feudal incidents, it is as
difficult to find the fountainhead of a modem humanitarian doctrine in 17 Edward II,
Chapters 9 and 10 as it is to find some great state beneficence underlying the modem
Internal Revenue Code. Chapter 10 was at best a limitation on the avaricious de-
signs of the sovereign in the case of lunatics, which has been given unbridled license
by Chapter 9 of the same statute with regard to the lands of born idiots or natural
fools.
The ineluctable conclusion follows that the early development of parens patriae
was in no way evidence of the sovereign's solicitude for the welfare of unfortunate
subjects, but rather was merely the natural result of the king's need for revenue com-
bined with medieval restraints upon the alienation of land which left valuable life
estates in the hands of born incompetents under a system of feudal as opposed to
modern allodial tenure, for in those days it can be said with ironic force that the law
was no respecter of persons.
Id. at 428-29, 202 S.E.2d at 118-19 (emphasis in original).
No support can be mustered nor reference cited which allowed the state to legitimately
compel a disabled person to submit to its compulsory protection by sacrificing his liberty. On
the contrary, the parens patriae power was necessary to curb such abuse in local lords and was
intended to be a narrowly-tailored device to safeguard wealth. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, supra note 4, at *481; Developments, supra note 7, at 1212 n.66. Cf. Myers, supra
note 9, at 382 n.73, 384.
35. Developments, supra note 7, at 1208-09; see also A. DEUTSCH, supra note 5, at 422-23.
These broad protective measures still did not incorporate the authority to confine disabled
persons for their own good. Involuntary commitment was reserved for the "violent and dan-
gerously insane." S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 22.
36. 1 Bland's Ch. 290 (Md. Ch. 1827).
37. The court stated: "The case is of a delicate and anomalous nature; yet it is one in
which, it is quite evident, that relief, by some means or other, ought to be granted. There are,
however, difficulties in the way, which must be overcome or removed." Id. at 292.
38. In re Mason, 1 Barb. 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1847); In re Barker, 2 Johns. Ch. 232 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816).
39. See Myers, supra note 9, at 385-86; see also La Fond, supra note 22, at 504-06. The
"sweeping" approval of the parens patriae authority pointed to by some in the language of a
few, isolated Supreme Court opinions is hardly that. In fact, the Court either merely restated
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concern with protecting the property interests of disabled persons.
The new guardianship statutes also granted the state the right to
confine a dangerous person prior to a judicial hearing. This temporary
detention was approved as a "necessity of the case. ' Although some
confusion developed as to the theoretical basis for this exercise of govern-
mental intrusion, subsequent decisions made clear that it represented an
exercise of the state's police power to prevent physical harm to either the
person or to others.4" It explicitly was not an expression of any duty to
promote the health of, or provide treatment to, disabled persons.
The break with the historical roots and conceptual foundation of the
parenspatriae doctrine is generally traced to the Massachusetts case of In
re Josiah Oakes.42 It was there, presumably for the first time, that a
court ordered confinement and care for the benefit of an individual. But
this alleged extension of authority to confine a nonviolent elderly man
who had married out of caste and who threatened to deplete his assets
was actually consistent with the original purpose of the parens patriae
power to protect property. The court also relied on the Commonwealth's
police power as a justification for insuring Oakes' safety. It couched its
allegedly novel authorization in traditional terms: a deprivation of lib-
erty of a person considered to be mentally ill was only permitted when-
ever his "own safety, or that of others, require[d] that he should be
restrained for a certain time, and [when] restraint [was] necessary for his
restoration . . . ." In fact, as other commentators have subsequently
the obvious, as in Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1855) ("The State, as a
sovereign, is the parens patriae") or, in a fuller exposition of the doctrine, simply sanctioned
litigation brought by the state in the name of its citizens. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 257 (1972). It is noteworthy that even this authority to initiate legal action focused on the
property interests of Hawaiian citizens. Id.
40. Colby, 12 N.H. at 530 (1842); see Developments, supra note 7, at 1209 n.56. The neces-
sity doctrine was intended as an interim measure, limited in duration and directly related to
the underlying purpose for detention. Colby, 12 N.H. at 530-31. It is analogous to the emer-
gency provisions of current commitment statutes. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER,
supra note 3, at 51-53 table 2.4.
41. See Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56-58 (1890) (power to provide
protection of the person and property); see also S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra
note 3, at 21 n.3. The government's traditional responsibility for preventing harm to its citi-
zens, previously expressed as an exercise of its police power, had been effectively reconceived
as a combination of this authority and a transposed version of theparenspatriae doctrine. The
distinction depended upon whether the threat of danger was to the disabled individual himself
or to other members of the community. This confusion still exists today, albeit in a less pro-
nounced form. See Hermann, supra note 19, at 95 (preventing harm to self involves both
police power and parens patriae power).
42. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 14.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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noted, the case is hardly novel at all;' the predicate of physical danger,
even if occasioned by incompetence and imprudence, was ostensibly still
required.
But as the beneficent motives of caretakers proliferated and the
facilities for confining people multiplied,45 the predeterminants of civil
commitment were eventually distorted beyond recognition. The con-
commitant conditions of physical harm and individual need were con-
verted into alternative requirements." The requisite of physical risk was
enlarged to encompass any threat to a person's well-being. The king's
responsibility to safeguard his incompetent subjects' financial security
was transposed to a mandate to promote their general welfare.47 A nar-
row royal obligation had become a democracy's license to fix.
From there, benevolent paternalism knew no bounds; the perversion
of a protective doctrine continued unabated. Just a century later, over
half a million people were civilly committed or otherwise involuntarily
confined in state mental hospitals at any given time.48 Most were deemed
to be mentally ill and "in need of treatment," although few were offered
the benefits promised. Vagueness of statutory definitions allowed a doc-
tor's declaration of mental illness to be legally equated with the royal
requirement of incompetence.4 9 The charity of society's motives to (co-
ercively) treat the mentally ill obscured the questionable extension of its
44. Developments, supra note 7, at 1209 n.56; see also Myers, supra note 9, at 380 n.62, 386
n.102. Some courts disagree, however, concluding that the case represents a major conceptual
transformation of governmental power over people labeled mentally ill. Lessard, 349 F. Supp.
at 1085.
45. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1085. Dorothea Dix alone was responsible for the founding of
32 mental hospitals, and for the enlargement of existing institutions in 20 states. She nearly
succeeded in obtaining a federal grant of over 12 million acres of land as a "reservation" for
the mentally ill. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 15.
46. Developments, supra note 7, at 1210 n.57. While the court of appeals in In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) did acknowledge in passing the possible legitimacy of commit-
ting nondangerous persons, it simultaneously cast into doubt the basis of the state's authority
to confine those who pose no risk to anyone. Id. at 658-60. It is of some significance that the
court was interpreting the constitutionality of a commitment statute which was limited to
individuals who were likely to injure themselves or others. Id.
47. In re Colala, 3 Daly 529, 533 (N.Y.C.P. 1871) (authorizing deportation of mentally
disabled Indian in order that he could return to a more temperate climate and familiar reli-
gious rituals to promote his well-being). The momentum accelerated with time. See, eg.,
Hammon v. Hill, 228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1969); In re Brown, 151 Mont. 440, 444 P.2d 304 (1968).
48. Some figures were even higher. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.22 (1972)
(estimates that 90% of the 800,000 patients in mental hospitals were involuntarily committed);
see also Developments, supra note 7, at 1193 n.3.
49. The movement began in the early nineteenth century. Mason, supra note 38. It ex-
ploded with the advent of psychiatry and the proliferation of diagnoses. Livermore, supra note
22, at 80. For an exceptional review of the taxonomy of mental illness, see id. at 80 n. 19.
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authority. It also left unchallenged, for over a century, the dubious ra-
tionale for segregating whole classes of citizenry and the often unnoticed
but omnipresent deprivations of their fundamental civil liberties.
Eventually some order was restored to the commitment process. In-
sightful commentators50 and inspired lawyers focused on the dramatic
extension of civil commitment and the previously unquestioned viola-
tions of constitutional guarantees.51 Substantive challenges to the stan-
dards for commitment and due process attacks on statutory mechanisms
for institutionalizing people with mental disabilities produced what some
labeled sweeping reforms, but which were mostly a return to historical
traditions and justifications. 2 Most notably, courts invalidated vague
statutory provisions for parens patriae commitments and required de-
tailed demonstrations of dangerousness as the primary, if not exclusive,
method of involuntary confinement under the state's police power.1
3
There could be no doubt that the unbridled expansion of the doctrine of
parens patriae was finally being curbed, and that the state's authority to
protect its incompetent citizens from harm was being restored to its
rightful foundation.
The United States Supreme Court entered the conflict belatedly but
decisively. After almost a century of silence since the states began their
expansion of civil commitment, the Court provocatively noted in Jackson
v. Indiana54 that "[clonsidering the number of persons affected, it is per-
haps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this
50. Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Reexamination, 51
MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1967); DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug Treat-
ment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 1149 (1976); Morse, supra note 12 (arguing for abolition of involuntary commitment);
Postel, Civil Commitment: A FunctionalAnalysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1971); Comment,
Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment
of the Mentally 11l, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 562 (1977).
51. One commentator suggests that the law itself was a bit schizophrenic by initially dele-
gating broad discretion and even quasi-judicial authority to physicians caring for people con-
sidered to be mentally ill, and then challenging these caretakers and their medically-oriented
decisionmaking process for contravening legal norms of fairness. Commitment in North Caro-
lina, supra note 29, at 987-89 & 987 n.10.
52. See cases cited supra note 30.
53. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1099-1102 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (in viewing dangerousness,
the court must examine the likelihood and magnitude of possible harm); Millard v. Harris, 406
F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Colyar, 469 F. Supp. 424 (to commit an individual under the
parenspatriae power, the state must show that the individual is: (1) mentally ill; (2) an imme-
diate danger to himself; and (3) unable to make a rational decision regarding his treatment);
Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). The best-reasoned and histori-
cally persuasive statement of this conclusion can be found in Hawks, 157 W. Va. at 427-30, 202
S.E.2d at 117-20.
54. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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power have not been more frequently litigated.""5 Although it initially
disavowed any need to evaluate the scope of the state's power to commit,
the court voided, on equal protection and due process grounds, the indef-
inite institutionalization of an incompetent criminal defendant who was
being held pursuant to lenient commitment standards which bore little
relation to any justifiable purpose for confinement. 6
Even more significantly that term, the Court decided the first case
which established the acceptable limits of a state's authority to commit
people with mental disabilities. In Humphrey v. Cady,57 the Justices sug-
gested that involuntary commitment required a "social and legal judg-
ment that [the person's] potential for doing harm, to himself or others, is
great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty."5 " This
suggestion was made explicit three years later in O'Connor v. Donald-
son.5 9 Although refusing to decide whether the provision of treatment
might ever legitimize the confinement of nondangerous persons, 60 the
Court left no doubt that institutionalization was certainly no benefit, in ,"
and of itself, regardless of the comparative living conditions available to
the person in the community. The constitutional test to be met in confin-
ing a mentally ill person was the individual's "ability to survive
safely"6 -the same standard routinely applied for centuries in England
and subsequently in the colonies as the appropriate limits of the police
power. 2
Addington v. Texas63 was the first case in which the entire Court
55. Id. at 737 (footnotes omitted).
56. Id. at 730, 738.
57. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
58. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted). Courts and commentators alike have correctly inter-
preted this command to preclude civil commitment of people with mental illness except upon a
finding of dangerousness: O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563; Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (to justify
involuntary commitment, there must be a showing that danger is imminent). This restriction
applies regardless of whether confinement is sought pursuant to the police power or parens
patriae principle. See Developments, supra note 7, at 1212, 1222. Most importantly, courts
have left no doubt that these parameters are constitutionally compelled. See Colyar, 469 F.
Supp. at 431; Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 514-15; see also cases cited supra note 30; Dix, supra
note 22, at 140-49; Morse, supra note 12, at 76-78.
59. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
60. Id. at 575.
61. Id. at 575-76. Only one member of the unanimous Court felt constrained to even
mention the term parenspatriae. Id. at 578 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Even the Chief Justice,
in challenging the then emerging concept of a constitutional right to treatment, emphatically
stated: "[T]he existence of some due process limitations on the parens patriae power does not
justify the further conclusion that it may be exercised to confine a mentally ill person only if
the purpose of the confinement is treatment." Id. at 583-84.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
63. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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validated the parens patriae authority as a justification to detain disabled
persons. Chief Justice Burger, in writing the majority opinion, made
clear that protecting an individual from physical harm to himself is a
legitimate exercise of that power.14 But even this rationale for state inter-
vention was not novel; it merely reflected the gradual shift in the concep-
tual categorization of danger to self, from the police to theparenspatriae
power. The limits of those powers, at least taken collectively, remained
intact.
Federal courts intervened in response to the doctrinal distortions
and excessive exercise of the state's authority to involuntarily institution-
alize people labeled mentally ill. The beneficent purposes underlying the
parens patriae power had perverted its appropriate constraints.6 5 The
legal limits imposed were less a "full retreat ' 66 than a return to the origi-
nal justification for the power-the state's responsibility to protect its
incompetent citizens from physical harm.
Not everyone appreciated this righting of the balance or return to
historical roots. 7 But legislatures either anticipated or followed the in-
structions of federal courts and uniformly revised their commitment laws
to reflect these restrictions on the state's authority to confine people with
disabilities.6 8 Psychiatrists deplored the criminalization of civil commit-
ment, both in terms of the adoption of analagous procedures and the
64. Id. at 426. This reference, however, was preceded by the Court's statement that "it is
indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental hospital after a finding of probable
dangerousness to self or others can engender adverse social consequences to the individual." Id.
at 425-26 (emphasis added). When read in this context, it is clear that the full Court was not
endorsing any return to the benign paternalism and attendant excesses of the past 100 years.
On the contrary, it was reaffirming that confinement and involuntary treatment were constitu-
tionally acceptable only to prevent physical harm to disabled persons or others in the commu-
nity. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574 n.9.
65. See A. DEUTSCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES 40-96 (1948); see also Quesnell v.
State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1973) (en banc); Morse, supra note 12, at 88 n.146;
Developments, supra note 7, at 1221, 1228. Institutional wards overflowed with disabled per-
sons who neither required hospital treatment nor received it. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 569; Wy-
att v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. Hawks, 157 W. Va. at 432, 202 S.E.2d at 120.
67. It is naive at best for some commentators to recite the history of the abuse of the
parenspatriae power during the first half of this century, replete with references to institutional
warehousing and socially sanctioned segregation, and then recommend its revitalization
through an expanded authority to involuntarily commit to community clinics those who might
benefit from psychiatric interventions. See Myers, supra note 9, at 409-11 (the shortcomings of
deinstitutionalization are exacerbated by involuntary commitment laws); see also Hermann,
supra note 19; Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29.
68. Most states now limit civil commitment to individuals considered to have a mental
illness who are dangerous to themselves or others. For a list of these jurisdictions, see La
Fond, supra note 22, at 499 n.4; see also S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at
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narrowing of the substantive criteria to potentially "dangerous individu-
als."69 Mental health professionals and critics claimed alarm at the re-
lease of persons who, although usually capable of caring for their basic
needs, were sometimes disoriented and occasionally crazy.70
Related but distinct social policies-notably deinstitutionalization
and community mental health care-were also enveloped into the trans-
formation of the civil commitment process. These policies were subse-
quently blamed for the natural and probable consequences of the legal
rebalance. 71 New proposals for restoring the parens patriae authority as
the centerpiece of state commitment schemes emerged.72 They were ad-
vocated by psychiatrists, local public officials, and parents of young
adults who could no longer be institutionalized and were less than enthu-
siastic about psychiatric prescriptions for treatment in the community.
Against this background, outpatient commitment has been heralded as
114-19 table 2.6; S. HERR, S. ARONS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH
CARE (1983); Hermann, supra note 19, at 94 & n.60.
69. Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior, 23 Host'. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 101, 103 (1972); see Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at
991; Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 28 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 817 (1977).
70. These clinicians appear to have a preoccupation with the lethal effect of the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g., Appelbaum & Gutheil, "Rotting With Their Rights On" Constitutional The-
ory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY AND THE L. 306 (1978); Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 992 n.30;
Treffert, "Dying With Their Rights On," 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1041 (1973). Like other
institutional caretakers such as police officers and prison guards, the doomsday predictions
rarely materialize.
71. Aviram & Segal, Exclusion of the Mentally Ill, 29 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
126 (1973); Myers, supra note 9, at 409; Talbott, Deinstitutionalization: Avoiding the Disasters
of the Past, 30 Hose. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 621 (1979). Some critics of the sensible
reforms of the past two decades would attribute America's housing shortage and its resultant
homelessness crisis to the reaffirmation by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts and state
legislatures of the dangerousness standard for civil commitment. Hermann, supra note 19, at
83-84. The National Center for State Courts takes a more reasoned view concerning the rela-
tionship between commitment laws and deinstitutionalization. See COMMITMENT GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 11, at 494.
72. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 65-70
(1975); Roth, A Commitment Law for Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1121 (1979); see Chodoff, supra note 17. For a critical and convincing analysis of these propos-
als, see Morse, supra note 12, at 87-93. There is also substantial doubt whether the recom-
mended changes would achieve their goals or, in fact, make any difference at all. See
Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 999-1002; Monahan, Ruggiero & Fried-
lander, Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commitment and the California Dangerousness Standard, 39
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1267 (1982); Pierce, Durham & Fisher, The Impact of
Broadened Civil Commitment Standards on Admissions to State Mental Hospitals, 142 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 104 (1985).
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the constitutionally acceptable compromise. 7
B. Outpatient Commitment
Outpatient commitment, in its simplest form, is designed to ensure
that treatment is accepted by nondangerous and presumptively capable
persons who can live safely in community settings. It is therefore not an
exercise of governmental power to protect incompetent individuals who
pose a serious physical threat to themselves; rather it is an expression of
the much enlarged authority which developed over the past century to
promote the health or interests of persons considered to be mentally in-
firmed. Even if it were restricted to those actually incapable of rendering
informed treatment decisions, the concept nevertheless represents a re-
turn to the state-sanctioned restriction of nondangerous persons in order
to further their supposed interests. This expanded exercise of the parens
patriae power has recently been cast into disrepute.74 Thus, the legal
justification for outpatient commitment depends either on a narrowing of
its application to dangerous people who clearly may be subjected to in-
voluntary psychiatric care, or on a showing of a separate governmental
interest for compelling treatment in the community rather than imposing
institutionalization.75
Limiting coerced community care to those dangerous mentally ill
individuals who otherwise would be civilly committed to an inpatient
facility might be immune from constitutional challenge but is politically
unacceptable and practically unfeasible."6 Requiring individuals who
pose a substantial risk of harm to themselves or others to participate in a
community mental health program as a dispositional option to involun-
tary hospitalization is an interesting and arguably compelling application
of the least restrictive alternative principle.7 7 But this is hardly what is
commonly understood as the proper scope or popular application of out-
patient commitment. In fact, when so applied, it apparently has been of
73. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 77-81; Myers, supra note 9, at 418-20;
Hermann, supra note 17, at 100-03.
74. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct.,
469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979); see Dix, supra note 22, at 140; Developments, supra note 7, at
1221.
75. A five year research project by the National Center for State Courts and its National
Task Force on Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment concluded that community serv-
ices should be provided with the person's consent. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11,
at 457, 460, 473, 483 (Guidelines D6, D8, E5, 15).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 252-56.
77. See infra notes 83-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the least restrictive
alternative principle.
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little utility or significance.7"
Alternatively, all civil commitment could be broadened to include
those who are not now within the scope of the state's police power or a
proper interpretation of its parens patriae authority-individuals who
pose no present danger to themselves or others but who, in the judgment
of mental health workers, would benefit from psychiatric treatment or
deteriorate in its absence.7 9 These individuals are less threatening to lo-
cal sensibilities and therefore generally would be considered appropriate
candidates for community mental health care. However, this approach
inevitably involves a significant expansion of civil commitment criteria,
which has little support in judicial decisions and directly contravenes the
constitutional parameters of coerced treatment.
A third alternative has been proposed: maintain the more restrictive
criteria for involuntary institutionalization mandated by the courts and
incorporated in most statutory schemes, but create a more encompassing
standard just for outpatient commitment.80 A few states have experi-
mented with this approach.81 It does address the practical constraints of
ensuring that only competent, compliant and nonthreatening persons are
committed to community programs without sanctioning the incarcera-
tion of those who are not dangerous. But it ignores the fundamental
limitations on the state's parens patriae authority to restrict the freedom
of any of its citizens which has been so widely abused in the recent past.
It simultaneously establishes a dual standard for the deprivation of fun-
damental liberties for reasons which hardly seem compelling.82
Regardless of allegedly humane motivations, outpatient commit-
ment proposals which sanction the involuntary treatment of competent
persons who do not pose any immediate risk to their own physical safety,
solely to improve their mental health, face substantial constitutional and
theoretical difficulties. They simply are not consistent with the legal
78. The conclusions of a detailed study in North Carolina before and after the passage of a
new outpatient commitment law are revealing. The authors determined that despite the avail-
ability of a statute permitting compulsory community treatment in lieu of involuntary institu-
tionalization, little use was made of this new procedure. A major reason given by respondents
to a survey was that those who were properly commitable were too dangerous to live in an
unstructured community setting. Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1009-13 &
n.l 14. The authors concluded that: "Overall, the statutory changes did not seem to have
made a significant difference in the use of outpatient commitment." Id. at 1013.
79. See supra note 72.
80. See Hermann, supra note 19, at 100-03; Myers, supra note 9, at 418-20.
81. See supra note 20.
82. This distinction faces serious constitutional difficulties similar to those which required
the invalidation of commitment statutes by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 730 (1972), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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foundation on which they purport to rest. On the contrary, they repre-
sent a significant distortion of the historical purpose and benign motiva-
tion of the parens patriae principle.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
There is no independent right to live in a particular place. Despite
the frequent use of the popular phrase "least restrictive alternative,"83
people labelled as mentally ill do not possess, by virtue of either their
citizenship or their disability, a constitutional entitlement to live in a spe-
cific environment or neighborhood. They do, however, have a compel-
ling claim not to be deprived of their fundamental liberties except under
narrowly tailored circumstances.84 The doctrine of the least restrictive
alternative, as applied to the civil commitment process, requires a consid-
eration of noninstitutional options to the involuntary hospitalization of
people with mental handicaps. 5
83. The term "least drastic means" has its historical roots in the Supreme Court's consti-
tutional adjudication. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); see, e.g., Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). For a fascinating and scholarly
account of this tradition, see Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964). The term "principle of the least restrictive alternative" was first
presented in the mental health literature by Professor David Chambers in his seminal article,
Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill" Practical Guides and Constitutional Im-
peratives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1111 n.9 (1972). Chambers expressed his gratitude to the
Supreme Court for not succumbing to "catchy phrase[s]." Id. at 1111 n.9; see also O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
84. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972) (equal protection clause prohibits differ-
ent commitment standard for persons declared incompetent to stand trial). Of course, this is
the same protection afforded all citizens. People with disabilities simply are singled out for
special restrictions in special places for reasons which are historically and constitutionally sus-
pect. See supra Part II of this Article; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct.
3249, 3266-68 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally
Morse, supra note 12.
85. There is no unified definition of the principle or established standards for its applica-
tion. The Supreme Court implicitly suggested a straightforward test: living independently or
with the help of family or friends. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. Other courts have proposed a
wider range of possibilities including identification cards, public nursing care, community
mental health and day care services, foster care, home health aides and other support services.
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Commentators have documented a still
more varied range of options. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 1112-19; Stein & Test, Alterna-
tive to Mental Hospital Treatment, 37 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 392 (1980). Finally,
national panels of experts have attempted, with questionable success, to identify the elements
which should be used to apply the principle. The Institute on Mental Disability and the Law
and the National Center for State Courts settled on the following nine factors to consider in
balancing the interests of the individual and the state:
(I) THE environmental restrictiveness of the treatment setting (e.g., inpatient hos-
pital, half-way house, or community mental helath center);
(2) THE psychological or physical restrictiveness of behavioral, chemical, or bio-
logical treatments;
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The least drastic means principle creates no independent rights, but
instead is an interpretative guideline for assessing whether an established
constitutional precept has been infringed. It imposes an additional bur-
den on the state to legitimize actions which impinge on otherwise pro-
tected privileges of citizenship. The state must demonstrate that care
was given to the selection of the form and extent of the proposed intru-
sion on individual rights, although the level of judicial scrutiny of the
means adopted may vary considerably. 6
The viability of the doctrine has depended greatly on two factors:
the rights at stake and the appropriateness of judicial second-guessing of
implementation options.87 In the early part of this century, the Supreme
(3) CLINICAL variables including the respondent's behavior as it relates to the
legal criteria for commitment, the relative risks and benefits of treatment alternatives,
and the family and community support available in the respondent's environment;
(4) THE quality and likely effectiveness of the care and treatment;
(5) THE duration of the treatment;
(6) THE risk that a respondent may pose;
(7) THE availability, cost, and accessibility of the treatment;
(8) THE likelihood of the respondent's cooperation in or compliance with the treat-
ment program; and
(9) THE mechanism for monitoring and reviewing a respondent's compliance with
the conditions of the treatment program.
LRA REPORT, supra note 11, at 329-30 (emphasis deleted by author).
It is hardly obvious that these are the right nine factors or even that a balancing of ques-
tionable considerations is appropriate. Applying a method of constitutional analysis should
not degenerate into a juggling act.
86. The concept itself implies a judicial role somewhat at odds with the separation of pow-
ers principle. For courts to analyze not merely the reasonableness of the objective but also the
propriety of the means chosen by the legislature involves an element of substituted judgment.
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 493-94 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In part, this tension is inherent in the
doctrine; in part, it is a measure of the right at stake. Where economic regulation is tested
under precepts of substantive due process, the subjectiveness of the constitutional concept
makes speculation about desirable public policy almost inevitable. See Schlesinger v. Wiscon-
sin, 270 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The tendency to second-guess legis-
lative judgments is mitigated, however, by principles of federalism and comity, deference to
professional judgment and administrative expertise, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 29 (1944), and the degree of judicial
comfort in resisting governmental limitations on individual rights. Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945). The relevant factors are carefully explained in Wormuth & Mirkin, supra
note 83, at 296-303.
87. Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 83, at 299, acknowledge the differing views of the
Justices on the relevance of these considerations, but conclude that most members of the
Supreme Court apply the principle by balancing these factors. The authors' summary two
decades ago holds equally true today:
When a constitutional order specifies the objectives of legislative power-health,
safety, welfare, morals, let us say-it prescribes some of the values to which the
society is dedicated. When the constitutional order guarantees certain rights-lib-
erty, property, freedom of speech and religion, jury trial-it prescribes additional
values. The world being what it is, collisions of values are inevitable. The doctrine of
the reasonable alternative is a technique for the adjustment of such collisions. When
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Court relied heavily upon the concept of the least drastic means to void
legislation under the commerce clause.88 Where freedom of contract was
at stake, the anti-regulationists on the Court could always find a better
means for accomplishing a legislative goal than the one chosen. Not sur-
prisingly, this judicial frustration of the representative process did little
to commend the doctrine to a less elitist Court. As notions of substantive
due process in the area of economic regulation fell into disfavor, so did
least restrictive analysis.8 9
The doctrine was revived, and perhaps found a permanent home, in
the emergence of first amendment jurisprudence during the 1920's and
1930's.90 By limiting the judicial choice of means as well as ends to the
central guarantees of citizenship-which later would be termed funda-
mental freedoms-the principle was restored to a position of respectabil-
ity. This culminated in the classic statement of the principle by the
Court in Shelton v. Tucker:91
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and sub-
stantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement
must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving
the same basic purpose. 92
With less vigor and greater unpredictability, the Court occasionally
invoked the doctrine in procedural due process cases. 93 It then gained a
firm hold in the substantive due process arena, at least when fundamental
rights such as association, 94 freedom from bodily restraint,9 5 travel, 96
it is available, it preserves both of the conflicting values and maintains the integrity of
the constitutional order.
Id. at 305.
88. See id. at 263-66.
89. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), explicitly
overruled Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), the last in a line of alternative means cases
in the economic regulation area. See Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 83, at 266.
90. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447
(1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
91. 364 U.S. 479.
92. Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
93. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see also
Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 83, at 293-96.
94. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433-36 (1963); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
67 (1960). But see Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-
12 (1984).
95. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 580; McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 248-50 (1972); Ex
Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300-02 (1944).
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voting97 and privacy98 were threatened. By the time the Court belatedly
acknowledged the plight of people with mental disabilities and the sordid
history of their confinement,99 the application of a principle mandating
legislative care and governmental restraint came as a natural extension to
the articulation of their basic rights of citizenship.
The trend began in the nation's capital where the federal court ap-
plies local law to commit people with mental disabilities to a federal insti-
tution. This unique arrangement was an obvious forum for the
application of flourishing procedural safeguards to new beneficiaries. In
Lake v. Cameron," ° the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit took the then radical step of questioning the continued institu-
tionalization of a harmless elderly woman in St. Elizabeth's Hospital.
Chief Judge Bazelon simply wondered whether something else could be
done to address the predictable consequences of the aging process: con-
fusion, loneliness and frailty. But to accomplish the obvious involved the
invocation of a concept then new to mental health law. The court, for
the first time, concluded that prior to involuntary institutionalization, the
government must bear the burden of demonstrating that no less restric-
tive alternatives are available. 01
The implications of this humanitarian gesture on the role of the
courts did not go unnoticed. There were many who were not persuaded
by the logic of the evolution. The dissenters in Lake complained that
local judges were not equipped "to initiate inquiries and direct studies of
social welfare facilities or other social problems."' 2 Until then, the least
drastic means doctrine had been limited to a standard for evaluating the
96. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 268-69 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 451 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 637 (1969);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964).
97. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 534 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 353 (1972).
98. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169 (1986); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 644-46 (1974).
99. See City of Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573-74; Jackson, 406 U.S. at 737; Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966).
100. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
101. Id. at 661. The court's list of possible alternatives reflected a preference for voluntary
services: "Every effort should be made to find a course of treatment which appellant might be
willing to accept." Id. But it apparently was willing to tolerate some element of coercion:
"The court may consider... whether she should be required to accept public health nursing
care .. " Id. Judge Wright rejected this latter caveat: "I cannot accept the proposition that
this showing automatically entitles the Government to compel Mrs. Lake to accept its help at
the price of her freedom." Id. at 662-63 (Wright, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 663 (Burger, J., dissenting). This may have been one of the initial expressions of
the Chief Justice's hostility toward the rights of people with mental illness. See O'Connor, 422
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acceptability of legislative choices concerning restrictions on the consti-
tutional rights of the entire citizenry, or at least a significant portion
thereof. It had never been applied on a case by case basis to individual
deprivations. Rather than reviewing legislative judgments, the Bazelon
approach obliged commitment courts to repeatedly analyze clinical rec-
ommendations for each person the government sought to confine in order
to determine which amongst several would be the least intrusive. 0 3 The
constitutional foundation for extending the least restrictive principle to
civil commitment may have been unassailable, but the process for its ap-
plication certainly was not.
The conceptual correctness of the majority's view prevailed. It ap-
peared to be a long leap from an Arkansas teacher's affiliation require-
ment to the involuntary hospitalization of people with mental illness
when a commentator first suggested that least restrictive analysis was an
essential component of civil commitment schemes. 104 But soon there was
virtual unanimity among the lower courts that mentally disabled citizens
could be validly committed only if there was no less restrictive means
which would serve the state's interests in protecting the person or the
community from harm.
What began as a review of individual confinement decisions soon
exploded into wholesale challenges to the entire commitment statute. In
Covington v. Harris,15 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit first applied the concept to ward assignments within a mental
hospital. 06 Soon the idea spread. 107 Frontal attacks on the commitment
statutes themselves, based upon the absence of a requirement to consider
U.S. at 578, 582 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
103. This methodology is not consistent with the historical application of the doctrine. See
Wormuth & Mirkin, supra note 83, at 254-55, 305. But it is not the principle which is dis-
torted by a shift from assessing the rationality of legislative judgments to evaluating the merits
of institutional alternatives; it is the extent to which this inquiry enmeshes the courts in clinical
considerations-an area the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused to enter. See Youngberg,
457 U.S. at 321; Parham, 442 U.S. at 607-08; see also infra text accompanying notes 266-74.
This quagmire can be skirted by limiting the analysis to the tension between the government's
responsibility to protect the safety of the community and the classic constitutional values of
personal liberty, physical freedom and individual choice.
104. The original article incorporating that creative observation has become the hallmark
for understanding the principle in the context of the involuntary institutionalization of people
with mental handicaps. Chambers, supra note 83. It is as delightful to read as it is provoca-
tive, although some of its conclusions seem unduly hesitant and deferential today. Id. at 1187.
105. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
106. Id. at 623-25.
107. See United States v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F.
Supp. 1022, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Kessel-
brenner, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973).
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alternatives to institutionalization, represented a significant expansion of
the doctrine."' 8 The measure of restrictiveness became an essential
calculus in the process and, in many states, one of the required findings
necessary to sustain involuntary hospitalization.
Although never explicitly discussing the doctrine, the Supreme
Court offered its tacit endorsement to the movement. At the outset it
cautioned that "the nature and duration of commitment [must] bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted." 109 Three years later, it invalidated the confinement "of those
capable of surviving safely in freedom, on their own or with the help of
family or friends," 110 citing the doctrine's constitutional flagship, Shelton
v. Tucker."'1 The signal was not lost on the states. Either on their own
initiative early in the evolution or at the insistence of federal courts later
on, almost every legislature revised its civil commitment statute to re-
quire a review of alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.1 ' Even if
these provisions were vague, leaving unanswered many issues such as the
burden of proof and the criteria for assessing restrictiveness, they left no
doubt about the doctrine's arrival.
113
108. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
procedural grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), va-
cated and remanded, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reaff'd, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976); see also
Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp.
1113 (D. Haw. 1976), modified sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Gallup v.
Alden, 57 Mass. App. Dec. 41 (1975).
109. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added).
110. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
111. 364 U.S. 479. See id. at 488-90.
112. A survey of all the states revealed that by 1972, 17 jurisdictions had statutes including
some reference to the provision of treatment in the least restrictive alternative. In 1977, this
number had increased to 35. As of 1982, it was 47, leaving only Alabama, Mississippi and
Oregon without some mention of the doctrine. See Lyon, Levine & Zusman, Patients' Bills of
Rights: A Survey of State Statutes, 6 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 178, 181-83 table 1 (1982)
(extent of compliance with Bill of Rights Section of Mental Health Systems Act). A more
recent survey focusing on the narrower issue of a statutory mandate to consider less restrictive
alternatives to involuntary hospitalization found 39 states with such a provision. The other 12
jurisdictions permit, but do not require, this review. Keilitz, Conn & Giampetro, Least Re-
strictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts into Practice, 29 ST. LouIs
U.L.J. 691, 709 n.101 (1985) [hereinafter Keilitz]. For a comparison of all the states' laws, see
infra Appendix.
113. The ambiguity of the legislative language and the uncertainty of its application have
led many to wonder what the principle really means in practice. Hoffman & Foust, Least
Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally 1ll: A Doctrine in Search of Its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1100 (1977); Keilitz, supra note 112. From the outset there has been substantial consen-
sus that the hospital or government has the responsibility to investigate community alterna-
tives and present them to the court or administrative body authorized to commit. Lake, 364
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The obstacle to translating the theory's promise into practice was
not the legal niceties of its application but the glaring absence of real
alternatives to state institutions. So impressive was the principle that the
next predictable step was to convert it into a justification for the estab-
lishment of community services. Originally suggested as the radical out-
station of the doctrine which would transform an interpretive guideline
into a constitutional mandate for resource reallocation,' 14 suits to compel
the creation of alternative programs proliferated." 5 Even repeated re-
buffs from the Supreme Court could not undermine the momentum of
the effort, which left at least those jurisdictions under suit with a substan-
tial complement of community services.'
16
This sanguine acceptance of the principle in the civil commitment
context lacks a more searching inquiry into the precise rights which are
at stake. Courts often evidence a concern that treatment is provided in
the least restrictive alternative, suggesting that clinical considerations of
F.2d at 662; Chambers, supra note 83, at 1168. There has been less agreement on allocating
the burden of persuasion. Hoffman & Foust, supra, at 1118. There is no consensus on the
court's responsibility to reach out on its own initiative to discover appropriate community
facilities. Compare the narrow approach advocated by one member of the panel in Lake, 364
F.2d at 663 (Burger, J., dissenting), with several proposals offered by Chambers, supra note 83,
at 1172-77.
What is universally understood by all observers is that the implementation of the principle
in different states is inconsistent, illogical and invisible. A survey of judges in Virginia showed
little comprehension of statutory provisions concerning noninstitutional alternatives, not much
sympathy with the option for many classes of people, and very limited utilization of it in
practice. Hoffman & Foust, supra, at 1124-38. A North Carolina study produced even more
disappointing results. Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 999-1002. Data like
this causes one to wonder whether lengthy articles like this are really necessary.
114. Chambers appears to be the first to have argued for the principle as a source of the
state's obligation to fund noninstitutional services. Chambers, supra note 83, at 1189-95.
Others disagree about both the constitutionality and wisdom of this strategy. See Develop-
ments, supra note 7, at 1252-53.
115. Cautionary notes concerning the proper function of the federal judiciary were ignored
and the litigation movement was on. Within five years, federal court orders and consent de-
crees embraced not only the principle but also the mandate. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), on
remand, 610 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (settlement agreement); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437
F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp. 71
(D. Neb. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Brewster v. Dukakis,
No. 76-4423-F (E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978) (final consent decree), reprinted in 3 MENTAL DISA-
BILrrY L. REP. 45 (1979), enforced, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. MASS. 1982), afld as modified, 786
F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986). But see Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N.H. 1981).
116. For a recent survey of community services cases, see 5 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
142-43 (1981); see also Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS
L.J. 595, 598 n.12 (1983).
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the type and place of care, rather than a legal analysis of the constraints
on liberty, should guide their conclusions. Two faulty assumptions un-
derly this proposition. First, the development of a nascent right to treat-
ment, as part of institutional reform litigation in the early 1970's, grafted
the least restrictive alternative principle onto this infant entitlement in
order to dictate the locus of service provision.117 Subsequently, substan-
tial doubt was cast over the existence of this treatment right, at least as
originally conceived under the quid pro quo theory of commitment and
especially as an independent constitutional mandate. 118 Even reformu-
lated as a corollary of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of liberty,
the parameters of a right to treatment are vague, leaving the least restric-
tive alternative doctrine attached to a tenuous foundation. 119
More importantly, since the purpose of the right to treatment is to
ensure that institutionalized persons are provided minimally adequate
psychiatric care, the doctrine has little logical application to an analysis
of this mandate. It is the existence of professionally acceptable treatment
which the due process clause mandates. The clinical means and locus
chosen to provide the treatment are of little constitutional relevance, 120
even if they are matters properly cognizable by the courts.
121
117. The right was first articulated in Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784. The court grounded the
entitlement in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It held that the govern-
ment must offer professionally adequate treatment to those it confines under its parens patriae
authority, given its singular legitimate purpose of providing care to disabled persons, and
under its police power, in light of the absence of procedural due process. Id. at 784-85. Other
courts followed its lead but not its reasoning. In Rockefeller, the guarantee was a consequence
of the right to be free from harm. 357 F. Supp. at 764. In Welsch, it was premised on the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as well as on the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. 373 F. Supp. at 499, 502-03. But even if the right's
constitutional foundation is shaky, its appeal to clinicians certainly is not. See Commitment in
North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1022 n.143 (mental health professionals feel strongly that
there should be a right to treatment).
118. See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 582-83 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Despite a unanimous
opinion which he joined, the Chief Justice went out of his way to attack the right and its
rationale, as well as the continued viability of the lower court's opinion. Id. at 580.
119. When the Supreme Court finally recognized a constitutional right to some degree of
care for people with retardation, it had difficulty defining the state's obligation. Youngberg,
457 U.S. 307. The majority went no further than necessary, restricting the entitlement to only
that habilitation necessary to enable institutionalized residents to be safe, to be free from physi-
cal restraint and to exercise other freedoms. Id. at 318-19. But it left open the possibility for a
more expansive interpretation of their liberty interests. Id. Three concurring justices (Black-
mun, Brennan and O'Connor) would have enlarged the right to protect people with disabilities
against deterioration and guarantee them the fulfillment of the state's statutory purposes for
confinement. Id. at 326-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
120. A more coherent approach would focus on needed treatment: "Instead of the least
restrictive alternative, the committing authority should aim at identifying the most effective
treatment alternative." Hermann, supra note 19, at 105.
121. A claim to state-funded services is currently limited to institutionalized persons whose
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The second erroneous assumption results from the wholesale trans-
position of the least drastic means principle to the area of mental health.
As the doctrine's resurgence in constitutional jurisprudence was peaking
almost two decades ago, mental health and retardation policy was in the
throes of a fundamental transformation. A series of technological devel-
opments resulted in legislative proposals to create community programs
as an alternative to public institutions.'22 These new services were touted
as more effective, more humane, less costly, and less restrictive. The con-
vergence of constitutional doctrine and social policy was quickly and qui-
etly accomplished. The talisman of least restrictiveness was soon
invoked as the legal mandate for community services. It was not long
before the least drastic means analysis was converted in some jurisdic-
tions to a clinical setting determination; the issue there was no longer the
standards or the methods selected as the proper measure of civil commit-
ment, but rather the place where involuntary treatment would occur.12 3
Not every state fell victim to this conceptual difficulty. In fact,
where well-intended motives were not translated into broad extensions of
the parenspatriae authority and did not serve as the legitimization of an
undefined obligation to treat, the principle of the least restrictive alterna-
tive remained true to its constitutional purposes. In these jurisdictions,
the interpretive guideline was properly applied to the most basic right
implicated by civil commitment-liberty. 24 Liberty could be measured
liberty has been circumscribed. Although distinctions concerning legal status (voluntary ver-
sus involuntary) may not be determinative, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v.
Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir. 1984), confinement is usually a precondition for the
government's obligation to treat. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317. But see Thomas S. v. Mor-
row, 781 F.2d 367, 374 (4th Cir. 1986) (state of North Carolina was responsible for providing
treatment for young, incompetent adult who had been ward of state from birth, even though he
had been released from state hospital).
A Supreme Court apparently enamoured by the wisdom of psychiatric judgments has
repeatedly warned lower courts that they must defer to the experts. See Youngberg, 457 U.S.
at 321-23; Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 499 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Parham, 442 U.S.
at 607.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. These new approaches to mental health care
mirrored, or were subsumed within, the legal principle of least drastic means. Keilitz, supra
note 112, at 697-700. As one commentator has noted: "[lit is likely that the application of
deinstitutionalization overlaps considerably with the application of the least restrictive alterna-
tive doctrine." Id. at 698 n.31.
123. This was always true in those jurisdictions such as Texas, Oklahoma, the District of
Columbia and others whose statutes authorized commitment to community programs. It be-
came even more evident in states which revised their procedures explicitly to encourage outpa-
tient commitment, based upon a lower standard than that governing institutionalization. See
states listed supra note 20 and infra Appendix.
124. See Commonwealth v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980). In fact, an
argument has been made that for commitment undertaken pursuant to the parens patriae
power, the doctrine has no effect, the only issue being whether acceptable standards for con-
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in several dimensions but physical freedom and the fundamental right to
control one's body were clearly the most relevant criteria. The least re-
strictive alternative doctrine was then properly a measure of the extent of
freedom restricted by state action. Coerced psychiatric treatment, no
matter where compelled, implied a "massive curtailment of liberty.
' 12 5
Conversely, truly voluntary care was undoubtedly the least restrictive
means for offering help. The ability to choose, not the geographic loca-
tion of forcibly imposed treatment, was the proper determinant of the
doctrine.
Focusing on liberty is not the only possible criteria for assessing the
least drastic means for achieving governmental objectives. As noted
earlier, the questionable rooting of the principle in a constitutional guar-
antee of treatment for involuntarily institutionalized persons would ar-
guably implicate the type of clinical interventions permitted. Others have
suggested that the effectiveness of the treatment techniques should be the
primary standard, with minimal if any attention paid to the consequent-
ial curtailment of physical freedom. 126 This approach relies heavily on
the assumption of an expanded parens patriae interest in promoting the
mental health of the citizenry and a concommitant individual entitlement
to high quality and effective, as opposed to minimally adequate, treat-
ment. A guideline for constitutional analysis would become a prescrip-
tion for psychiatric intrusion, with medical standards of improvement
becoming the measure of the full implementation of the principle.
A third alternative would establish a complex balancing between ef-
fective treatment modalities and the least drastic of the most promising
options. Not surprisingly, there are various views on the relevant criteria
for assessing the restrictiveness of different forms of mental health
care. 127 Consensus is not only elusive but impossible. The sheer number
finement (incapacity and harm to self) are sufficiently satisfied to justify the resultant depriva-
tion of liberty. Developments, supra note 7, at 1248-49.
125. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268,
1277 (D. Conn. 1981).
126. Predictably, this proposal was from psychiatrists. Chodoff, supra note 17, at 498-99;
Hoffman & Foust, supra note 113, at 1144; Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at
1021-22; Stromberg & Stone, supra note 17, at 293. Some academics have been persuaded. See
Hermann, supra note 19, at 103-05; Myers, supra note 9, at 422. Interestingly, the Stone and
Stomberg model, which was adopted by the American Psychiatric Association in 1982, explic-
itly omits any procedure for judicial commitment to community programs. What some see as
its noticeable weakness, Myers, supra note 9, at 418 n.265, may be its finest attribute.
127. The Institute on Mental Disability and the Law of the National Center for State
Courts has nine such criteria. See supra note 85. The physicians have five. Hoffman & Foust,
supra note 113, at 1147. The professors suggest infinite possibilities. Myers, supra note 9, at
423. Perhaps the most sensible is the most simple: liberty. See Developments, supra note 7, at
1249.
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of variables, to say nothing of their differential weighting, creates an
alarming number of permutations and possible formulas. Charts and
scales are often necessary to map the selection process, with medical ex-
perts guiding the judicial decisionmaking process in individual cases.' 28
Ironically, many clinicians decry this notion of graduated treatment
techniques that can be viewed on a scale of restrictiveness. They would
abandon the entire approach, leave least drastic means analysis to the
first amendment, and preserve the discretion to do what seems, in their
judgment, best for any person who meets the statutory criteria for civil
commitment.'29 While their arguments go too far, their challenge to the
spectrum of restrictiveness is well-founded, particularly in the recogni-
tion that objective criteria for intrusiveness are a precarious proposition.
For the principle of the least restrictive alternative to retain vitality in the
commitment context, it should adhere to its original moorings in the sub-
stantive guarantee of liberty and be limited to a simple measurement of
coerced versus voluntary care. Such an approach is not only consistent
with the historical development of the doctrine as a guideline for assess-
ing governmental limitations on fundamental freedoms (as opposed to
time-limited interpretations of substantive due process); it also respects
the proper role of the courts in weighing restrictions on liberty rather
than evaluating the benefits of competing treatments.
From this perspective, outpatient commitment has little to do with
the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative. Where courts either in-
voluntarily confine disabled persons to mental health facilities located in
the community as opposed to the grounds of a public institution, or com-
pel compliance with a treatment plan that frequently includes the admin-
istration of psychotropic medication, the critical guarantee of liberty has
been sharply curtailed. Coerced psychiatric treatment, pursuant to a ju-
dicial commitment order, is a massive curtailment of freedom, no matter
128. For a topography of restrictiveness and a road map to "wellness," see Myers, supra
note 9, at 421. A different approach eschews the variable of physical freedom for the constant
warping effect of time. Hoffman & Foust, supra note 113, at 1144-46. According to this view,
effectiveness of treatment recedes in importance over time, as restrictiveness increases in rela-
tive value. Even the Supreme Court was confused by a much simpler calculus. Youngberg,
457 U.S. 307 (reversing a sliding scale of restrictiveness adopted by a majority of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals).
129. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 17, at 291-94; see also Gutheil, Appelbaum & Wexler,
The Inappropriateness of "Least Restrictive Alternative" Analysis for Involuntary Procedures
with the Institutionalized Mentally Ii, 11 J. PsYcHIATRY & L. 7 (1983); Commitment in North
Carolina, supra note 29, at 1021 n.141. This may be one of the few critical issues on this
subject where legal adovocates and mental health professionals agree. See Keilitz, supra note
112, at 744. "[T]he demands placed on the LRA doctrine itself for a determination of a spe-
cific relationship between restrictiveness and treatment effectiveness, or for the establishment
of a hierarchy of treatment restrictiveness, are unreasonable." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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where accomplished. It is not made substantially less drastic by shifting
the locus of the compulsion.
This is not to say that a case cannot be made that involuntary com-
munity treatment has certain advantages and impinges on certain rights
to a somewhat lesser extent. It is arguable that confinement to a general
hospital inpatient unit or a locked community residence is less isolating
than institutionalization at a state hospital, although basic guarantees of
communication, association, travel and privacy may be forfeited. It may
be true that there is more physical freedom living in a community pro-
gram which requires compliance with a detailed treatment plan than in
remaining on a locked ward; however, fundamental rights of bodily in-
tegrity and choice are still drastically curtailed. But it is undoubtedly
true that each occasion substantial restrictions of a person's liberty. To
argue that some are more faithful expressions of the principle of the least
drastic means necessarily requires the adoption of a complex spectrum of
restrictiveness which integrates several dimensions: locus of the pro-
gram; effectiveness of the mental health treatment as measured by the
nature, intrusiveness, frequency and duration of the intervention; the rel-
ative importance of the individual's rights; and the type, extent and dura-
tion of the restriction imposed on the exercise of each right. Such a
multi-variable analysis is too intricate for local courts to undertake on an
individual basis. A new geometry of mental health would be needed. It
would, of necessity, rely on the balance struck by the psychiatric experts
who inform the judicial process. It could not escape becoming a forum
for the competing values and disciplinary perspectives which underlie the
very spectral dimensions. It is simply too arbitrary to be functional.
Outpatient commitment is conceivably a valid dispositional alterna-
tive to serve the state's interest in civil commitment, but it has little to do
with least drastic means analysis. It is hardly a modem application of
the doctrine. On the contrary, involuntary commitment to community
programs can be viewed as a drastic extension of current alternatives that
will work no less intrusion on the fundamental freedom of people labeled
as mentally ill to be or not to be treated.
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF STATE LAW
Outpatient commitment, in its simplest form, is a statutory proce-
dure which permits civil courts to compel persons labeled mentally ill to
participate in mental health services in community settings. 130 The stat-
130. For related definitions, see COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 78-79; Miller
& Fiddleman, supra note 17.
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utory scheme usually includes a standard for determining which individ-
uals may be subjected to compulsory care, a procedure for initially
imposing and then reviewing the mandated treatment, and a description
of the type of psychiatric intervention which may be ordered. A more
probing investigation, however, reveals that this straightforward concept
is increasingly elusive. Substantial differences exist among states which
authorize outpatient commitment as to the existence and content of stan-
dards and procedures. 131  Commentators disagree whether statutes,
which merely permit a court to select a community program rather than
an institution as the dispositional alternative for civil commitment satisfy
the definition of true outpatient commitment. Some argue that the ab-
sence of a comprehensive scheme to modify or revoke a court order, if an
individual fails to comply with coerced care, precludes labeling it as an
involuntary community treatment provision. 132 Thus, even from a
purely procedural perspective, outpatient commitment is a vague propo-
sal lacking in common definitional elements, to say nothing of a coherent
purpose.
Arguably, outpatient commitment is not a radical reform of current
practice. A mechanism for providing compulsory community care
in a range of settings is already available in most jurisdictions under ex-
isting statutes.133 In addition, virtually every state permits the adminis-
trative transfer of judicially committed persons from an institution to a
community program.1 34 While these provisions may be procedurally
flawed, 135 they nevertheless serve a somewhat similar purpose to outpa-
tient commitment by requiring forced participation in community treat-
ment in exchange for partial release from commitment to an inpatient
facility. The acceptable parameters of existing outpatient and adminis-
131. See infra Appendix. See also infra text accompanying notes 138-214 for a review of
state laws.
132. One view holds that the essence of outpatient commitment is the judicial authority,
incorporated in the state's civil commitment statute, to require a person to participate in a
noninstitutional, mental health program. See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 148; My-
ers, supra note 9, at 418-20. A contrary position maintains that this judicial discretion is
meaningless without enforcement powers; anything less does not qualify as outpatient commit-
ment. See Keilitz, supra note 17, at 9.
133. See infra Appendix.
134. Forty states have such provisions. S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3,
at 205 table 4.3, cols. 7-9. For a discussion of several statutes, see id. at 206 and infra text
accompanying notes 215-19.
135. Significant due process problems are inherent in most states' discharge statutes. These
constitutional infirmities affect laws governing transfers between state mental institutions, be-
tween mental health and correctional facilities, and even between community settings, at least
where such movement is to a more restrictive environment. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B.
WEINER, supra note 3, at 204, and infra text accompanying notes 215-19.
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trative discharge schemes are just recently being defined and refined by
the courts.
136
The current debate focuses not so much on whether involuntary
community treatment is ever legally possible, but whether it should be-
come more prominent and accessible in the civil commitment process.
The real dispute concerns the desirability of substantially modifying
commitment standards and procedures to provide enhanced flexibility
and, presumably, an enlarged pathway to coerced care. These broader
commitment criteria usually represent a significant extension of the
parens patriae authority. They encompass nondangerous persons who
are determined to need mental health treatment, are at least intermit-
tently compliant with psychiatric services, and are likely to suffer "emo-
tional deterioration" without treatment, but are clearly not so
handicapped as to be unable to participate in a treatment program or to
care independently for themselves.
There is little question that such a substantive statutory modifica-
tion, achieved through the umbrella of outpatient commitment, is
designed to reverse the judicial and legislative trends of restricting com-
mitment criteria to "imminent danger to self or others." Empirical re-
search also demonstrates that the modification will dramatically affect
the numbers of people labeled mentally ill who will be caught in the not
so safe net of civil commitment.1 37 Moreover, even where outpatient
commitment provisions include no alteration in the criteria for involun-
tary treatment, there is substantial reason to believe that the increased
dispositional alternatives may, if utilized, enlarge that commitment net.
A. State Statutory Provisions for Involuntary Outpatient Commitment
Considerable confusion, even among public officials, exists with re-
spect to the meaning and application of involuntary outpatient commit-
ment. A recent national survey of attorneys general and mental health
directors in all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands, demonstrates that there is substantial disagreement over
whether outpatient commitment is even authorized in their jurisdic-
136. For a discussion of recent cases interpreting involuntary treatment laws, see infra text
accompanying notes 220-30.
137. A comprehensive study of the impact of revisions in Washington's civil commitment
statute found a compelling correlation between lowering the standard and increasing the
number of people confined. Durham & La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy
Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 395 (1985). There was a 180% increase in admissions at the institution which served all
of western Washington State, forcing a virtual cap on bed capacity. Id. at 411-12.
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tions. 138 Although forty-two administrators believed that their states
sanctioned compulsory community treatment, 139 in instances where both
the mental health directors and attorneys general responded to the sur-
vey, only seventy-four percent agreed on whether an outpatient commit-
ment provision existed in their respective states."4°
A careful review of state law reveals the omnipresent role of condi-
tional release and the emergence of judicially-ordered outpatient commit-
ment. In 1984, the National Center on State Courts conducted the most
comprehensive analysis, which is summarized below based upon the ta-
bles reprinted in the Appendix to this Article."' It indicates that signifi-
cant differences exist among those states which explicitly permit
outpatient commitment in the areas of: (1) community versus hospitali-
zation standards; (2) prehearing and hearing procedures; (3) disposition,
rehearing and release options; (4) compliance monitoring and revocation
mechanisms; and (5) the specificity, or lack thereof, of the entire outpa-
tient scheme. 142 It demonstrates that involuntary community treatment
is not a uniform concept capable of consistent implementation. On the
contrary, with the exception of a few states which have substantially en-
dorsed the outpatient commitment model through the enactment of de-
tailed procedures and revised standards, most jurisdictions thus far have
not utilized this comprehensive approach, although more may do so in
the future. This historical disinclination is probably attributable to a va-
riety of practical problems and implementation obstacles attendant to in-
voluntarily treating people labeled as mentally ill in community
programs. It is questionable whether these systemic barriers can be over-
come, even in those states which have fully adopted an outpatient com-
mitment model.
138. Miller, Commitment to Outpatient Treatment: A National Survey, 36 Hosp. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 265 (1985).
139. Id. at 265.
140. Id. at 265-66.
141. See infra Appendix. The tables contain citations and classifications of statutory provi-
sions in effect as of 1983. They disclose basic similarities as well as critical differences among
state laws. The charts present only statutory provisions that expressly apply to involuntary
community treatment or apply to both involuntary hospitalization and outpatient commit-
ment. Civil commitment standards that generally pertain to all involuntary persons are not
included unless the standards specifically mention outpatient commitment. Table headings are
not mutually exclusive and are necessarily general because of differences among the statutes.
Finally, sections mandating only treatment in the "least restrictive alternative" were not con-
sidered as explicit authorization for outpatient commitment.
142. See generally id.
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1. Statutory authorization and substantive standards
State statutes can be classified in one of three major categories: (1)
those which do not explicitly authorize outpatient commitment and are
therefore thought to preclude it, at least by implication (twenty states);
1 43
(2) those which permit compulsory community care but identify no im-
plementation procedures (twelve states and the District of Columbia);14
and (3) those which both authorize involuntary community treatment
and articulate specific implementation provisions (eighteen states).1 4 No
statute expressly precludes coerced treatment in the community.
The first category can be divided into two classes: (1) those states
which equate involuntary civil commitment with inpatient hospitaliza-
tion and do not even have community program references (nine
states); 146 and (2) those which authorize institutionalization only after a
143. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10 (Supp. 1984); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5152 (West
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-178(c) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 394.467(2)(a) (West 1986); IDAHO CODE § 66-329 (I)-(K)(3) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-14-9.1-20 (Burns Supp. 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.026, 202A.051 (Baldwin
Supp. 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E) (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
34-B, § 3864(E) (Supp. 1984-85); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-623 (1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09 (West
Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.335(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 433A.310 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-58 (West 1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.15(e) (Anderson Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(10) (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-7-36 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(j) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 25-10-1100)
(1982).
144. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.755 to .760 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1415(c)
(Supp. 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-109(4) (Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5010(2) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545 (1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4) (Supp.
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-127(2)(a) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1038 (1981); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:37 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-11(d) (1984); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 9.31(c) (McKinney Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f) (Purdon
Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 31.1-67.3 (1985).
145. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-506.5 to .7 &
§§ 88-508 to -512 (Supp. 1986); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 334-121 to -134 (1985); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 91 1/2, paras. 3-811 to -813 (Supp. 1984-85); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229.11, 229.14 to .16
(West Supp. 1986-87); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2918(a)-(e) (Supp. 1986); MIcH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 330.1468 to .1477 (West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-261 to -294 (1986);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 5-204, 5-401 to -
407 (West Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580 (Law.
Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 27A-9-18 to -29 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-6-201 (1984 & Supp. 1986); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-50 to -53 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7617 to 7802 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 71.05.210 to .320 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20 (West Supp. 1986).
146. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5152; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-178(c); IDAHO
CODE § 66-329(k)(3); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-14-9.1-20; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E);
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-623; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.335(4); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-58; Wyo. STAT. § 25-10-110G).
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finding that there is no less restrictive alternative (eleven states). 147 Mas-
sachusetts is typical of the second class. There, although civil commit-
ment requires a threshold determination that no alternative to
hospitalization exists,148 the only disposition available to the court is in-
stitutionalization or release.149
It is sometimes difficult to analyze commitment schemes due to the
imprecision of statutory language. For instance, although Nevada is in-
cluded in the first category, its statute arguably allows outpatient com-
mitment in some form. One section provides that when a court
determines that an individual meets the standards for civil commitment,
it may order involuntary admission to the "most appropriate course of
treatment." 150 The statute also requires the exploration of other forms of
care in the least restrictive environment, which is in the best interest of
the individual, prior to any order for involuntary admission or the re-
newal of an existing order.'51 Nevertheless, a judge apparently has no
discretion to order community treatment and is limited to the one statu-
torily authorized disposition-commitment to a mental health facility.
152
Other inconsistencies make classification difficult. Although in-
cluded in the first category, Minnesota and Kentucky sanction coerced
community care prior to a judicial determination that the individual
meets the commitment standards.'53 The Minnesota statute permits con-
ditional release to family members or interested individuals. Even
though the only judicial disposition allowed is discharge or hospitaliza-
tion, the court must make specific findings that "voluntary" outpatient
care and "release before commitment" are not suitable alternatives.
15 4
After the hearing but before an order has been entered, the court may
release the individual to the custody of any person or agency on the con-
dition that the care and treatment of the individual are guaranteed. The
court may revoke this conditional discharge, after notice to the individ-
ual and a hearing upon its own motion or upon the petition of any other
147. See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(b); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 202A.026, 202A.051; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123 §§ 4, 8; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09; NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.310; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5122.15(e); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(10); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36; W. VA.
CODE § 27-5-40).
148. See Commonwealth v. Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 406 N.E.2d 1286 (1980).
149. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 8(e); see also Northampton State Hosp. v.
Moore, 369 Mass. 957, 336 N.E.2d 856 (1974).
150. NEV. REv. STAT. § 433A.310(1)(b) (1986).
151. Id. § 433A.310(3).
152. Id. § 433A.310(1)(b).
153. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202A.051, 202A.081; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(I).
154. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.09(1).
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person; however, it lacks direct control and supervision over the person's
activities. 155
The second category of statutes comprises states which explicitly au-
thorize outpatient commitment but fail to identify any implementation
procedures.1 5 6 Given the absence of such practical mechanisms, the like-
lihood that involuntary community treatment will be a meaningful alter-
native has thus far been insignificant.
There is also a wide divergence of statutory requirements in this
group. For example, Colorado"5 7 and the District of Columbia15 permit
any form of community treatment which a court believes will be in the
best interest of the person or thepublic. This approach may be frequently
utilized and subject to abuse if the latter factor becomes a predominant
consideration. Virginia allows a person who meets the criteria for invol-
untary treatment, but who is not in need of hospitalization, to be sub-
jected to court-ordered outpatient care or "such other appropriate
treatment modalities as may be necessary to meet the needs of the indi-
vidual." 159 The statute includes no other reference to community op-
tions. These vague and open-ended provisions provide little guidance to
courts and could well result in a de facto expansion of the standard for
coerced treatment in the community.
At the other end of the spectrum is Arkansas, which has enacted a
statute with distinct criteria for outpatient commitment. 6 It applies the
same test which governs institutionalization but also requires clear and
convincing evidence that the person: (1) has been involuntarily commit-
ted within the previous two years; (2) is suffering from a mental disease
or disorder that has been treated successfully by medication; and (3) be-
comes severely disabled, homicidal or suicidal when not regularly taking
medication prescribed for his or her condition. 6' This statute, like most
in this group, does not allow competent individuals to refuse treat-
ment.' 62 Additionally, it creates a questionable distinction between new
and long-term clients of the mental health system, precluding the former
from being considered for community treatment.
63
The third category of statutes comprises those states which not only
155. Id. § 253B.09(4).
156. See supra statutes cited in note 144.
157. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-109(b)(4).
158. D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b).
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3.
160. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1409.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also infra Appendix.
163. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1409.
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authorize outpatient commitment but establish detailed implementation
procedures for its monitoring, modification and revocation. 16' Signifi-
cant variation exists concerning the specificity of these statutory
provisions.
Oregon is representative of those states with few requirements for
involuntary community treatment. Its statute does not even reference
alternatives to hospitalization. 165 After determining that an individual
meets the civil commitment standard, a court can authorize his condi-
tional release to the care and custody of a legal guardian, relative or
friend. 166 The court retains the exclusive discretion to determine
whether it is in the individual's best interest to return to an inpatient
setting, with no requirement for a revocation hearing.
67
On the other end of the continuum are Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kansas, North Carolina and Tennessee, which have comprehensive pro-
visions for outpatient commitment. It is significant that these are the
only jurisdictions which have substantially amended their commitment
laws in the past three years, lending substantial support to the claim that
comprehensive schemes for involuntary community treatment are a na-
tional trend. North Carolina often is viewed as the model for this move-
ment, since strikingly similar legislation has been subsequently enacted
by other states, including Hawaii and Georgia. 6
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, North Carolina and Tennessee
have adopted distinct outpatient commitment standards which differ
from the criteria governing involuntary hospitalization.' 69 In Arizona,
the standards are the same.'70 The new criteria in Georgia, Hawaii,
North Carolina and Tennessee are the most glaring testaments to the
expansiveness of governmental control inherent in this supposed re-
164. See supra statutes cited in note 145.
165. OR. REv. STAT. § 426.130.
166. Id. § 426.130(2). This disposition occurs at the end of the commitment proceeding
and differs from prehearing provisions found in other states like Minnesota, see supra note 154,
since the court maintains control over the person.
167. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130.
168. See Four States Enact New Mental Health Statutes in 1984, 2 MENTAL HEALTH L.
REP. 3 (1985).
Hawaii's new involuntary outpatient commitment law-only the second of the kind
in the nation-headlines the list of new mental health legislation enacted by states
last year.... Similar to the trail blazing North Carolina law passed in 1983, the
Hawaii law allows a family court to commit a person to outpatient treatment if cer-
tain conditions are met.
Id. at 3; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2918(a)-(e).
169. See infra Appendix table one; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2918(a)-(e) and 59-2919.
170. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.
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form.171 For instance, in North Carolina a person may be involuntarily
hospitalized only if the court finds that the individual is mentally ill or
mentally retarded and is dangerous to himself or others.172 Involuntary
community treatment, on the other hand, requires simply that "[b]ased
on the respondent's treatment history, the respondent is in need of fur-
ther treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration
which would predictably result in dangerousness." '73
Tennessee permits judicially-ordered treatment if the individual's
condition, resulting from a mental illness, is "likely to deteriorate rap-
idly" to the point that the person would pose a "likelihood of serious
harm." '174 This formulation expands the scope of persons subject to in-
voluntary community care from the traditional limitation of currently
dangerous to the much lower threshold of probable psychological regres-
sion and possible future dangerousness.
1 75
The most striking example of this trend is Georgia. Its new statute
requires a finding that the individual does not meet the standard for in-
voluntary commitment to an institution, but given his condition, will
need outpatient treatment to avoid "predictably and imminently becom-
ing an inpatient." 176 By shifting the focus away from current or even
future dangerousness, the standard invites a dramatic increase in the
number of persons potentially subject to coerced psychiatric care, partic-
ularly given the large population of people who are labeled as seriously
mentally ill and are always at risk of hospitalization.
177
The other prerequisites for outpatient commitment vary widely
among the states. However, almost all mandate a determination that:
(1) the person is able to live safely in the community; (2) he is unlikely to
become dangerous to himself or others; (3) there is an available commu-
171. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-506.2 and 88-508.2; HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.2 to -58.11A; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201.
172. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(2).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1).
174. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-104(a).
175. Skeptics who doubt the ability to predict any form of future behavior abound. The
problem becomes more complex as the projected actions become more remote. As one com-
mentator succinctly noted:
Standards such as "dangerous" or "need for hospitalization" have no generally
agreed upon meaning among lay persons or professionals. Of course, there is likely
to be a great deal of agreement about extreme cases, but such cases are unusual.
Thus, it may be claimed, each witness, lay or professional, along with each fact
finder, injects his or her own private meaning into the criteria, rendering the system
essentially lawless.
Morse, supra note 12, at 72.
176. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-501 (12.1)(A).
177. Goldman, Adams & Taube, Deinstitutionalization: The Data Demythologized, 34
HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 129, 131 (1983).
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nity program; (4) the court has approved a detailed treatment plan; and
(5) the person will cooperate with the treatment plan."17 Michigan is the
only state to have a statute which inquires into the individual's prefer-
ences concerning alternatives to hospitalization. The effect of these uni-
form elements of involuntary community treatment ironically may be to
narrow the class of individuals who are actually eligible for outpatient
commitment, despite broader statutory standards. In fact, by restricting
the option to nondangerous, compliant persons, the entire scheme may
be available mainly to persons who would otherwise be voluntary recipi-
ents of care.
The North Carolina statute obliges the court to make findings of
fact that outpatient treatment is available and appropriate. 179 This may
be an attempt both to compel availability and to increase communication
between local judges and mental health treatment providers. However,
problems with implementation continue in North Carolina and else-
where, raising further questions about the viability of involuntary treat-
ment.' The relative dearth of community mental health services in
conjunction with increased, but nonetheless ineffective, administrative
coordination and monitoring pose substantial obstacles to the widespread
use of coerced community care.18 1 It may be that outpatient commit-
ment already has or will become synonymous with forced medication,
given the lack of community mental health alternatives. Curiously, only
seven states explicitly authorize psychotropic medication as a form of
community treatment, l8 2 although it is not precluded in the other juris-
dictions in this category. In only eight states may an individual be com-
mitted to a treatment regimen that does not include a structured, mental
health program, such as the custody of family or friends." 3
Most outpatient commitment statutes do not address the issue of an
individual's legal competency and corresponding ability to consent to
treatment.18 4 Since courts have repeatedly held that commitment, in and
178. See infra Appendix table one.
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-271(4).
180. See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 149.
181. Keilitz, supra note 17, at 13.
182. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-14-09(c); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-501 (12.2), 88.501 (17); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 334-122; NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1038; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-3(27); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 33-6-201(2); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(13)(dm); see also infra Appendix table
one.
183. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121(2); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-73(4); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-21-127(2)(a) (ii)-(iv); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-
263(d)(1)(b); OR. REv. STAT. § 426.130(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 7617(d).
184. See infra Appendix table one.
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of itself, does not render a person incompetent nor constitute a determi-
nation that he is unable to consent to care, 185 compulsory treatment
should not follow ineluctably from a judicial declaration of commitment.
Several states, however, have included provisions in their outpatient stat-
utes which require a finding that the person is mentally ill and unable to
voluntarily seek or comply with outpatient treatment. 8 6 This determi-
nation partially ameliorates the statutory deficiencies which exist in other
jurisdictions. But these additional elements fail to establish any criteria
for assessing such "inability" and incorrectly equate it with the legal in-
capacity to consent.187 Moreover, to the extent that any serious mental
illness is assumed to distort a person's perception of his need for psychi-
atric intervention, resistance to treatment could be used to prove the
predicate of mental disability. Such a tautology solves little and further
complicates the delicate task of ensuring meaningful consent.
2. Procedural safeguards and implementation mechanisms
Statutory implementation provisions are even more inconsistent
than are their substantive standards. Although all jurisdictions in the
third category have prehearing examination procedures, few other states
do. Absent from most statutory schemes are requirements to review
community alternatives prior to a hearing. 8 8 For instance, even though
Florida specifies a number of options which can be implemented before
the initial court appearance, it is unclear whether any resultant commu-
nity treatment is voluntary or involuntary. 89 This omission is less con-
sequential in those states which mandate probable cause determinations;
but it is seriously problematic in others, such as Georgia, whose newly
amended statute allows up to thirty days, excluding weekends and holi-
days, to convene a hearing following the filing of an outpatient peti-
tion.'90 It is odd that an individual can be hospitalized involuntarily
pending judicial review, after it has already been determined by a mental
health professional that he is an appropriate candidate for community
care.
Both North Carolina' 9 ' and Hawaii'92 permit prehearing confine-
185. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Rogers v.
Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983).
186. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-501 (12.1)(B); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-121(5); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1)(d).
187. See generally id.
188. See infra Appendix table two, col. 1.
189. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.463(2)(c).
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-510(a).
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-267(a).
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ment for up to ten days. There is a presumption in Hawaii that the eval-
uation will be conducted in the community, but the statute also
authorizes commitment to a psychiatric facility when the person will not
voluntarily consent to an outpatient examination. 193 The court has simi-
lar discretion in Arizona to order either inpatient or community
assessments. 
194
Arizona, Hawaii, Kentucky, North Carolina and Wisconsin have
provisions for the revocation of prehearing outpatient status.195 The
North Carolina statute further stipulates that if an individual becomes
dangerous to self or others and requires hospitalization, the outpatient
proceedings are terminated and institutional commitment is automati-
cally initiated.196
Although only Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, North Carolina and Ten-
nessee have enacted comprehensive outpatient commitment proce-
dures, 197 several states have ancillary requirements that must be met
before involuntary community treatment can be ordered. The most com-
mon is a provision permitting courts to admit into evidence, and requir-
ing them to consider, the psychiatrist's written recommendations or
testimonial statement, usually rendered by affidavit, regarding the appro-
priateness of compulsory care.198
If a court-ordered treatment regimen is violated, the individual is
usually subject to involuntary hospitalization for the remainder of the
commitment order.199 Generally, the time periods for coerced commu-
nity care and institutionalization are the same. Longer periods for outpa-
tient commitment exist in Arkansas,2°° Hawaii 20' and Michigan,
20 2
where the maximum initial period for hospitalization is 45, 90 and 60
days as compared to outpatient orders of 180, 180 and 90 days, respec-
tively. Georgia's initial inpatient confinement is for 180 days;20 3 there is
no time limit on community care. In Iowa, institutionalization and in-
voluntary community treatment are both authorized for indefinite
192. HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-124.
193. Id. § 334-126(g).
194. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-529(a).
195. See infra Appendix table two, col. 1.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-265(e).
197. See infra Appendix table two, col. 3; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2918(a)-(e).
198. See infra Appendix table two, col. 3.
199. See id. table four, col. 4.
200. Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-1409 with § 59-1415(c).
201. Compare HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-60.5(i) with § 334-127(b).
202. Compare MicH. COMp. LAWS § 330.1472(1) with § 330.1472(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1986-
87).
203. See GA. CODE ANN. § 88-506.2.
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periods. 2°
An individual committed to outpatient treatment is able to petition
the court for early termination of the order only in North Carolina, Ari-
zona, Hawaii and Vermont.20 5 In all of these states there must be prior
notice to the court which entered the initial order or within whose juris-
diction the community treatment program is located.2 6 Hawaii also in-
sists that notice be given to interested parties who are identified in the
original order.20 7 Should any person object to the proposed early dis-
charge, a hearing must be held before a local court.20 8
Although seventeen jurisdictions have some monitoring and revoca-
tion components, only eleven are procedurally distinct from their volun-
tary treatment sections.209 These eleven states do allow the court to
modify the original treatment plan, including ordering involuntary hospi-
talization, without again considering the person's mental status.210 They
generally require a hearing to ascertain the cause of noncompliance and
to consider appropriate revisions, if any, to the original order.
Revocation and modification of outpatient commitment, including
institutional confinement, can occur in six states without a hearing.2 1
Such decisions are presumably based on the evidence presented at the
original proceeding, the individual's medical record, additional affidavits,
and informal recommendations of physicians or other professionals in-
volved in the treatment plan.212 The period of hospitalization runs from
the date of the initial order. This lack of supplementary procedural pro-
tection may reflect the reality that institutional and outpatient commit-
ment result in similar restrictions on liberty and therefore do not
implicate separate constitutional interests or involve a significant differ-
ence in the conditions of confinement.
Georgia, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina and Vermont do
require a full supplemental hearing before a modification or revocation
204. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.14(2)-(3).
205. See infra Appendix table three, col. 3.
206. Id.
207. HAW. REv. STAT. § 334-131.
208. Id. § 334-132.
209. See infra Appendix table four, cols. 2, 3; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2918(f).
210. Id.
211. See id.; see also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.D.4 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91
1/2, para. 3-812(b)(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2918(f); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 25.03.1-21; OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130(2); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320(1); Wis.
STAT. § 51.20(13)(d).
212. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-540.D.4.
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can occur.2 13 Notice and other procedures equivalent to those in the first
proceeding are assured.214 The mandate in Hawaii and North Carolina
that the commitment process be initiated de novo is reasonable, given the
different criteria for outpatient and inpatient commitment. However,
this justification apparently was not persuasive to the Georgia and Ten-
nessee legislatures when they enacted their new involuntary community
treatment statutes and incorporated dual commitment criteria.
B. Conditional Release
Every jurisdiction makes some provision, through statute or regula-
tion, for transfer from an institutional to a community setting even
though the person remains under a civil commitment order.215 Although
the nature and duration of the transfer, the procedures for initiating and
revoking the discharge, and the role of counsel, courts and the client in
the process may differ among the states, they share the common conse-
quence of sanctioning involuntary participation in community treatment.
These existing release mechanisms do differ in several respects from
the purer versions of outpatient commitment. The former is exclusively
an administrative option while the latter is primarily a judicial process. 216
Conditional discharge occurs after a person has been committed to an
institution, while involuntary community treatment is a dispositional al-
ternative to hospitalization in the first instance. Few written require-
ments exist regulating the granting or revocation of conditional release,
while several statutes establish detailed criteria and procedures for re-
viewing and modifying outpatient commitment. Most importantly, the
former implies no revision in the commitment standards, while the latter
may, but does not necessarily, depend on a lower threshold for depriving
individuals of their freedom.
The procedural distinctions between conditional release and outpa-
213. GA. CODE ANN. § 88-506.3(a)-(b); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-129(c); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 122C-274(c)(1)&(2); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580(2); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.18, § 7618(b).
214. Id. See infra Appendix table four.
215. The concept of conditional release is referred to by different names: administrative
placement, conditional discharge, parole, leave or visit status. Similar to an administrative
transfer, it involves movement of an individual from one sector of the mental health system to
another. It differs in that the person technically remains a client of the initial program, regard-
less of his actual residence. With a transfer, all legal, clinical and administrative responsibility
shifts from the originating facility to the receiving one.
216. Most state commitment statutes establish a judicial mechanism for determining
whether the standards for confinement are satisfied. A few, like the District of Columbia, vest
this authority in a quasi-judicial or formal administrative tribunal. All mandate the traditional
indices of due process: notice, hearing, counsel, presence (with exceptions), confrontation,
decision and appeal. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 122 table 2.7.
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tient commitment, however, may be illusory. Both require a formal find-
ing, usually by a court, that the person satisfies the criteria for civil
commitment before his liberty can be initially curtailed. While the
method for determining where the coerced treatment should be under-
taken does differ between the two schemes,217 the elaborate process for
reviewing, modifying and revoking outpatient orders may apply with
equal force to substantial alterations in discharge decisions. This is cer-
tainly true when a mental health administrator seeks to reverse the con-
ditional release determination and return the person to an institution.
Courts have recently and repeatedly drawn an analogy between con-
ditional release from an inpatient program and parole from a correc-
tional facility. Since the interests at stake are similar, these cases have
concluded that the process for restricting those interests should be paral-
lel, if not identical. 218 The constitutional minimum necessary to ensure
fairness and reliability must be available before a civilly committed per-
son who has been conditionally discharged to a local program can be
reinstitutionalized, or perhaps even transferred to another, more restric-
tive community setting.219 Thus, the informality and potential arbitrari-
217. Under most transfer procedures, once institutional confinement is authorized, shifting
the locus of the involuntary care is an informal, often unreviewable decision of hospital staff or
administrators. It is customarily grounded in unspoken clinical criteria and is often accom-
plished in unannounced treatment team meetings of which the person is neither informed nor
permitted to attend. Outpatient commitment provisions, on the other hand, generally rest on
the authority to identify appropriate treatment modalities and localities in a judicial officer,
exercised as part of the commitment process.
218. The Supreme Court has applied rigorous procedural protections to the deprivation of
liberty ocasioned by the revocation of parole, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and
probation, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). That the liberty interests were already
restricted was not a determinative factor to the Court. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481-84. Adopt-
ing this reasoning, lower courts have held that the interest of mental health clients in their
freedom from institutional confinement, even if conditioned upon compliance with a certain
treatment regimen and still remaining subject to a civil commitment order, deserves the same
protection. Birl v. Wallis, 619 F. Supp. 481 (M.D. Ala. 1985); Lewis v. Donahue, 437 F. Supp.
112 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Meisel v. Kremens, 405 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re James,
507 A.2d 155 (D.C. 1986); Richardson v. Ellerbee, 481 A.2d 473 (D.C. 1984); In re True, 103
Idaho 151, 645 P.2d 891 (Idaho 1982); In re Cross, 99 Wash. 2d 373, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). See
Note, Constitutional Law: The Summary Revocation of an Involuntary Mental Patient's Con-
valescent Leave-Is It Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 366 (1980).
219. Most courts have required notice and some form of hearing, although they differ on
whether a judicial or a formal administrative proceeding is sufficient. There is less consensus
on the issue of whether legal counsel is necessary, particularly after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), where only a plurality supported the person's right
to be represented by an attorney at a transfer hearing. Id. at 496-97. A few courts have re-
jected the parole analogy and entrusted the revocation decision entirely to clinicians. See
Hooks v. Jaquith, 318 So.2d 860 (Miss. 1975); Dietrich v. Brooks, 27 Or. App. 821, 558 P.2d
357 (1976). But the better and more modem view that due process requirements apply to
parole revocations was convincingly expressed by the court in BirI:
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ness of conditional release may no longer be constitutionally acceptable.
Instead, clinical decisions to substantially modify involuntary commu-
nity treatment must be subject to similar procedural requirements,
whether accomplished pursuant to administrative discharge or outpatient
commitment provisions.
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Outpatient Statutes
The concept of outpatient commitment, and particularly its ana-
logue, conditional release, may not be new, but the frequent use of these
options apparently is. Few courts have been asked to interpret involun-
tary community treatment provisions or even to apply them to specific
facts. 22 Only two cases have been found which directly address the con-
stitutionality of outpatient commitment; both were limited to challenges
against dissimilar community and inpatient procedures. 221 The few pub-
lished decisions reflect a cautious acceptance of the approach, a narrow
reading of the standards and a reluctance to sanction unbridled clinical
discretion in modifying mandated treatment.222 Not surprisingly, there
Parole and the trial visit program share several characteristics. First, both constitute
a conditional release intended to permit the parolee or patient to demonstrate that he
can function in society. "The parolee has been released from prison based on an
evaluation that he shows reasonable promise of being able to return to society and
function as a responsible, self-reliant person." Similarly, the trial visit is a "test of...
ability to cope," according to Bryce Hospital's manual. Furthermore, both the pa-
rolee and the mental patient on trial visit enjoy considerable liberty. "Subject to the
conditions of his parole, [the parolee] can be gainfully employed and is free to be with
family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life." Birl
was equally free from restraints on trial visit, for the evidence showed that Birl was
required only to "try to situate [himself] back into the community" and to continue
with therapy and medication. In light of the similarities between parole and trial
visits, the Court's conclusions in Morrissey clearly apply. Regardless of the fact that
Birl's release on trial visit was only conditional, therefore, he was still entitled to
certain procedural protections before his release could be terminated. As the Court
noted in Morrissey, "the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process[.]
[sic]"
619 F. Supp at 490 (citations omitted) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482-83
(1972)).
220. The dearth of reported decisions may be misleading. Many states have only recently
enacted comprehensive legislation authorizing outpatient commitment and have not had much
opportunity for reviewing these laws. Moreover, commitment matters are customarily decided
by lower courts which usually do not report their decisions, making analysis of actual practice
difficult. Except in a few jurisdictions like the District of Columbia, Illinois, Minnesota and
Washington, these cases apparently are rarely appealed.
221. In re G.K., 147 Vt. 174, 514 A.2d 1031 (1986) (indeterminate order for involuntary
community treatment violated due process); Wisconsin ex rel. Watts v. Combined Community
Servs. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d 65, 362 N.W.2d 104 (1985) (lack of periodic review of involuntary
community placement denies equal protection).
222. See Birl v. Wallis, 633 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1986); In re James, 507 A.2d 155 (D.C.
1986); In re Cross, 99 Wash. 2d 373, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).
1374
June 1987] DISABILITY RIGHTS SYMPOSIUM 1375
is a principled concern with process and a generous deference to the doc-
trine of the least restrictive alternative.
Most courts have been preoccupied with procedural protections.
This is especially evident in the frequent situation where a person con-
tests the attempt by a mental health professional to impose more restric-
tive treatment conditions-usually hospitalization. If convinced that the
statute incorporates sufficient safeguards to minimize error, judges have
often been willing to overlook substantive deficiencies or to ignore consti-
tutional challenges.22 3 What. constitutes adequate process is itself in dis-
pute, with a few courts receptive to an argument for flexibility and
unreviewed authority advanced by clinicians.22 4 The majority, however,
have maintained a rather rigid adherence to adversarial models and re-
quire the full panoply of due process rights.225
223. See In re McPherson, 176 Cal. App. 3d 332, 222 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1985); In re Mills, 467
A.2d 974 (D.C. 1983).
224. Mills, 467 A.2d at 974. The court reasoned that since an individual "enjoyed only very
limited freedom... he was required to participate in any treatment regimen prescribed by the
hospital staff. .. ." Id. at 976.
Another panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that summary
hospitalization of a person who had a full hearing prior to the initial outpatient commitment
order is constitutionally permissible, provided that the superintendent files an affidavit with the
court within 24 hours of the person's confinement describing the treatment noncompliance and
resultant deterioration. In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 481 (D.C. 1984). The court assumed
that "the probable value of a judicial hearing is not great... [since] [t]he decision to return the
patient will be made by mental health professionals familiar with his medical history." Id. at
483. The court was convinced that the government's interest in confining a person who fails to
adhere to a treatment plan and its efforts to "restore the individual to sanity" would be
"thwarted" by an adversarial hearing, where "speedy intervention is frequently necessary to
prevent rapid deterioration" and "to preserve the advances made toward rehabilitation." Id.
225. C.R. v. Adams, 649 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1981) (court abstained, but strongly suggested
detailed procedures are appropriate). In In re G.K., the Vermont court declared that since
involuntary community care impinges on the rights of travel and freedom from unwarranted
intrusion on bodily integrity, heightened procedural protections are necessary. It found the
protections due to be no less rigorous than those governing involuntary institutionalization.
G.K., 514 A.2d at 1032. This approach is in marked contrast with the relaxed standard
adopted in the District of Columbia. See Richardson, 481 A.2d 473 (court can include provi-
sion in outpatient order permitting reevaluation and temporary placement in an inpatient facil-
ity without the need for additional hearing or judicial review). Ironically, the Richardson
court based its conclusion on a similar understanding of the implications of involuntary treat-
ment. "The outpatient will be compelled to participate in a prescribed course of treatment and
must abide by severe restraints governing his freedom of movement. Similarly, as he lives in a
'controlled experiment with freedom,' his actions will be scrutinized and evaluated by psychia-
trists, family and the court." Id. at 482. But the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
disagreed with the Vermont Supreme Court in its assessment of the relevant factors to be
considered and the proper balance to be struck in safeguarding those interests:
Further, any interest the outpatient has in not being labeled mentally ill is greatly
attenuated here since he has been adjudicated as mentally ill and dangerous and
institutionalized on numerous occasions in the past.... Moreover, the outpatient's
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There is less consensus concerning the proper standard for revoca-
tion of outpatient status. In part, the divergence results from distinct
provisions of state law which are often vague and varied.226 One view
holds that noncompliance with court-ordered treatment, demonstrated
by competent evidence, is sufficient in and of itself to justify rehospital-
ization.227 In other jurisdictions, there must be a determination that the
person currently satisfies the criteria for institutionalization before he can
be transferred to an inpatient setting.228 Within the latter group, there is
considerable disagreement as to whether a de novo hearing on the per-
son's current mental state and present dangerousness is necessary, or
whether prior findings on these issues can be relied upon to effectively
renew or revise the commitment order.
Finally, in almost every state there is at least token recognition of
the doctrine of the least restrictive alternative. Hospitalization is rarely
ordered without some mention that it is the most appropriate environ-
ment which, under the circumstances of the case, is also the least intru-
sive upon the person's liberty.229 But what constitutes such a substantial
intrusion and what evidence of other community programs must be con-
sidered varies widely among the states.2 30 However, a common theme
interest in these cases is only in the continued enjoyment of his conditional release
pending the outcome of certain medical and factual determinations due him.
Id. This view may have been repudiated by a more recent decision of the District of Colum-
bia's Court of Appeals. See James, 507 A.2d at 155.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 138-214 and infra Appendix.
227. McPherson, 176 Cal. App. 3d 332, 339-40, 222 Cal. Rptr. 416,419-20; Richardson, 481
A.2d 473, 479-80; Cross, 99 Wash. 2d 373, 662 P.2d 828.
228. Birl, 633 F. Supp. at 711 (court "rejects the notion that hospital should be free to
reconfine a newly released patient at the first sign of trouble so as to prevent ... further
deterioration"); In re Crouse, 65 N.C. App. 696, 698-99, 309 S.E.2d 568, 570 (1983) (inpatient
commitment findings were sufficient to sustain outpatient order); In re Crainshaw, 54 N.C.
App. 429, 283 S.E.2d 553 (1981) (commitment reversed because standard was not satisfied); In
re G.S., 118 Wis. 2d 803, 348 N.W.2d 181 (1984) (although appeal dismissed as improperly
presented, court notes that whether community status can be revoked absent new finding of
dangerousness raises serious constitutional issue).
In the only reported direct challenge to the standard for temporary hospitalization, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated a portion of its outpatient commitment statute, holding
that the state's power to institutionalize a person who is subject to involuntary community
treatment must be founded on a determination that the individual is or will be dangerous to
himself or others. Combined Community Serys. Bd., 122 Wis. 2d at 89, 362 N.W.2d at 115-16.
229. James, 507 A.2d 155; In re W.H., 144 Vt. 595, 481 A.2d 22 (1984).
230. In re Lufsky, 379 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (hospital is least restrictive alter-
native when person resists community care); In re M.C., 716 P.2d 203 (Mont. 1986) (hospital
is least restrictive alternative); In re J.B., 705 P.2d 598 (Mont. 1985) (failure to take medica-
tion requires institutionalization and precludes further consideration of community services);
In re Cuypers, 389 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1986) (noncompliance with outpatient treatment regi-
men renders institutionalization necessary).
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does emerge throughout the cases: implementing outpatient commit-
ment procedures is a far more complex task than legislating them.
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION MAZE
While outpatient commitment has been an available option in most
jurisdictions for many years, several factors have precluded states from
relying extensively on what is arguably a more desirable alternative.
These operational barriers include: (1) the lack of appropriate commu-
nity mental health programs; (2) the difficulty of compelling committed
individuals to comply with treatment plans; (3) the probability that few
persons would comply with court-ordered treatment and yet be unwilling
to voluntarily participate in a community program; (4) the reluctance of
mental health providers to treat their clients involuntarily and subject
themselves to judicial supervision; (5) the absence of judicial mechanisms
and personnel to adequately supervise outpatient care; (6) the resistance
of neighbors and public officials to accept committed persons in their
community; (7) the fears of professionals concerning liability for inade-
quate treatment or foreseeable harm; and (8) the potential creation of a
governmental obligation to fund a comprehensive system of community
services for individuals subject to outpatient commitment.
Even those few jurisdictions that have substantially modified their
statutes to incorporate detailed provisions for outpatient commitment
have had little success in achieving the promised benefits of this
model.231 On the contrary, while more people are being confined to insti-
tutions under revised commitment criteria,2 32 few are being placed in
231. With a few exceptions, most states which have had some form of involuntary commu-
nity care have never evaluated its impact. The most scientific and controlled research design
just published assesses several hundred clients committed under a new Tennessee post-hospital
commitment law. It concluded: "At the very least, we can say that the data do not support
the effectiveness of the law." Bursten, supra note 17, at 1257. An earlier empirical study in
North Carolina came to the same conclusion: "[The statutory] changes did not make a signifi-
cant difference in the effectiveness of outpatient commitment as a therapeutic modality."
Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 149. A review of practices in Arizona, Arkansas and
Hawaii by the National Institute of Mental Health concurred. Owens, supra note 17, at 23, 28,
36; see also LRA REPORT, supra note 11.
232. A careful analysis of the consequences of lowering the commitment standard in the
state of Washington revealed striking evidence of increased utilization and decreased quality of
care. Durham & La Fond, supra note 137, at 434-35. The authors warned:
This study provides strong empirical evidence that revising statutory commit-
ment criteria to expand the state's authority to confine and treat mentally ill persons
for therapeutic purposes will significantly increase the number of individuals involun-
tarily committed to psychiatric facilities.... Without adequate additional resources,
other mentally ill persons, most of whom are probably indigent, who had previously
sought and received inpatient care and treatment from the public mental health sys-
tem on a voluntary basis, will be unable to obtain these services and will be left to
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community settings, even under compulsion of a court order. The practi-
cal problems of providing psychiatric care in the community have not
been adequately addressed by these statutory reforms. Given their mag-
nitude and complexity, they probably cannot.
A. The Availability of Community Services
Rarely are commentaries on mental health law or policy published
today which do not include some scathing criticism about the depopula-
tion of public mental hospitals over the past twenty years and the failure
of most states to develop adequate community support services.233 These
observations range from the insightful to the irrational. Some recognize
that the much heralded social policy of community mental health care
was, and still is, a viable systemic reform that has not failed but just has
never been meaningfuliy attempted.234 Other critics ignore the lure of
real estate tax incentives and the consequences of supply side economic
theory when they insist that the homelessness crisis in America's cities is
primarily the product of deinstitutionalization. 235 Regardless of the reli-
fend for themselves as best they can. Enacting a civil commitment statute that ex-
pands the power of the state to commit mentally ill persons for therapeutic purposes
also raises the strong possibility that a large number of persons will become institu-
tionally dependent for the first time in their lives. Many of these patients may well
become chronic users of state psychiatric hospitals....
This study also warns that, if a state legislature is determined to expand dramat-
ically the reach of the involuntary civil commitment system, it must at the same time
appropriate adequate additional resources if it is to have any hope of achieving the
therapeutic purposes sought. Failure to provide sufficient funding for such a legisla-
tive initiative could result in overcrowded state mental health institutions with poten-
tially harmful consequences to patients.
Id. at 444; see also Durham, Implications of Need-for-Treatment Laws: A Study of Washington
State's Involuntary Treatment Act, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 975 (1985).
233. E. TORREY & S. WOLFE, CARE OF THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL (Public Citizen
Health Research Group 1986); Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health
Services, 238 ScI. AM. 46 (1978); DeRisi & Vega, The Impact of Deinstitutionalization in Call-
fornia's State Hospital Population, 34 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 140 (1983); Talbott,
The Fate of the Public Psychiatric System, 36 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 46 (1985).
See also S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 31 n.74 and Commitment in
North Carolina, supra note 29, at 992 n.28 for articles discussing this issue.
234. Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally 111: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Af-
fairs and Health of the House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 155
(1981) (statement of John A. Talbott, Professor of Psychiatry, Cornell University Medical
College); Pepper & Ryglewicz, Testimony for the Neglected: The Mentally Ill in the Post-
DeinstitutionalizedAge, 52 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCIHATRY 388, 389 (1982). In perhaps the most
illuminating article, Dr. Rohn Friedman identifies the social and clinical determinants of this
country's inertia in honoring its community commitment to people with serious mental disabil-
ities. Friedman, Resistance to Alternatives to Hospitalization, 8 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N.
AM. 471, 472-78 (1985).
235. The clinical interpretation of the nation's homelessness dilemma as the product of mis-
guided community mental health policies ignores the stark reality that it is first and foremost a
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ability of the research or the soundness of the theory, all agree that, with
the exception of a few geographic areas, comprehensive community care
is a myth. There is an unusual degree of consensus among parties who
rarely share common views that the first priority for almost all states
should be the development of an adequate array of less restrictive com-
munity alternatives.3 6 More than any tinkering with involuntary treat-
ment criteria or wholesale modifications of civil commitment schemes,
the actual availability of community programs would have the most dra-
matic impact on the current crisis in mental health care.
Ironically, outpatient commitment advocates invoke this historical
failure and present dilemma as a justification for compelling treatment in
the community. They argue that an attractive and effective means to
stem the "revolving door" syndrome produced by irresponsible deinstitu-
tionalization is to enhance the government's and psychiatrist's authority
to coerce care. Statutory modifications, if not the sole solution, are cer-
tainly the primary one.
In the absence of a meaningful alternative, however, outpatient com-
mitment is no more than a theoretical possibility. To achieve the alleg-
edly beneficent purposes of the model, a comprehensive system of
community services is necessary so that appropriate treatment can be
provided according to the unique needs of each individual. A few addi-
tional programs will not do. A collective of alternatives which are ade-
quately staffed and monitored must be available if modifications in the
person's treatment plan are required. These must encompass a spectrum
of residential program models ranging from relatively independent hous-
housing problem. Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 Hosp. &
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 899 (1984). The shortage of affordable low-income and transient
rental units is more directly attributable to real estate tax shelters, condominium conversion in
urban centers and massive reductions in federal housing benefits than the consequence of any
institutional mental health program.
236. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 423-24, 512. Some states have already
tried to develop alternatives to involuntary civil commitment. See, eg., LRA REPORT, supra
note 11, at 226-33 (Virginia), 280-82 (New York), 333-35 (Arizona, California, Missouri and
Wisconsin); Keilitz, supra note 112, at 732. See generally Hammaker, A Client Outcome Eval-
uation of the Statewide Implementation of Community Support, 7 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILI-
TATION J. 2 (1983); McGraw & Keilitz, The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine in Los
Angeles County Civil Commitment, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 35 (1984); Miller & Fiddleman,
supra note 17, at 148; Owens, supra note 17, at 23 (Arizona), 30 (Arkansas), 37 (Hawaii), 53;
Stein & Test, supra note 85.
Data reveals that of the more than seven billion dollars controlled by state mental health
agencies, less than 25% is devoted to community and outpatient care. NATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRECTORS, FUNDING SOURCES AND EXPEND-
ITURES OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH AGENCIES: REVENUE/EXPENDITURE STUDY RESULTS
FISCAL YEAR: 1983 at 8, 11 (1985). This figure does not include federal Medicaid funding
which is exclusively used to support inpatient services in private facilities.
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ing to structured and well-staffed community living arrangements. Simi-
larly, an integrated network of nonresidential services must be available,
including emergency crisis intervention, respite care, clinical assessment,
service coordination and case management, support in daily living skills,
employment training, recreation, socialization and medication. Unless a
sufficient array of programs is created, there will be no place to commit
people. If only a few medication clinics and day treatment centers are
established, outpatient commitment will promptly resemble its inpatient
counterpart-judicially-mandated placement in settings wholly incapable
of providing even minimally adequate or individually appropriate care.
In short, for outpatient commitment to be more than the empty
promise of deinstitutionalization, states must first do what they have thus
far been unwilling to do: implement their social, statutory and fiscal poli-
cies of community mental health care. This is at the least expensive, and
at best, unlikely. It is difficult to believe local legislatures will fund the
development of a system of treatment, training and support services that
has a sufficient capacity to assist individuals unwilling to accept volun-
tary care when these same elected officials have ignored the pleas of con-
sumers, families, professionals, advocates and judges to establish such
programs for truly needy persons who desperately seek help without any
coercion.237 Absent this effort, outpatient commitment is a dysfunctional
legal response to a service system vacuum.
B. Compelling Compliance With a Treatment Regimen
It is well established that many people labeled mentally ill are less
than enamored with traditional psychiatric interventions and clinical
techniques.238 The literature in this area is replete with descriptions of
categories of people prone to reject involvement with a medically-ori-
ented mental health system. 39 Often this resistance is considered symp-
237. E. TORREY & S. WOLFE, supra note 233, at 18; see also Talbott, Toward a Public
Policy on the Chronic Mentally Ill Patient, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 43 (1980). Optimis-
tic projections on the likelihood of community program development resulting from commit-
ment law revisions have been disproved before. See Bleicher, supra note 12, at 101.
238. Consumer satisfaction surveys are rare. However, the literature, public policy posi-
tions and presentations of the consumer movement strongly reflect dissatisfaction, if not dis-
gust, with traditional mental health programs. J. CHAMBERLAIN, ON OUR OWN (1978); J.
Chamberlain, The Case Against Involuntary Treatment (Oct. 16, 1986) (unpublished manu-
script presented to the 1986 Annual Conference of the National Association of Rights Protec-
tion and Advocacy, Boston, Massachusetts). One of the more extreme distortions is the
psychiatrists' claim that this disenchantment actually reflects a deeper desire to be treated with
traditional clinical interventions, but that this preference is subtly masked by the very thought
disorder that requires fixing. See Chodoff, supra note 17, at 498.
239. A comprehensive study of over 3500 individuals has identified several factors relating
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tomatic of a disability, if not a critical characteristic of the illness itself.
The "treatment noncompliance" of certain state hospital clients is repeat-
edly cited as the foremost clinical issue to be addressed by outpatient
commitment. 24°
If those diagnosed as needing treatment were willing to accept these
offers of professional cures, civil commitment could be largely abolished.
The debate regarding involuntary treatment would become virtually
moot, rendering it unnecessary to resolve whether there is in fact a dis-
ease at all and whether governmental action is appropriate to promote
certain citizens' mental health.241 One possibility for achieving this goal
is to dramatically improve the attractiveness, accessibility and quality of
the services offered. Presumably, by making the offer more enticing,
there will be more takers. There would also be the additional clinical
advantages associated only with voluntary care that often have been
noted by mental health experts.242
to noncompliance, including race, age, behavior, length of stay in community programs, family
involvement, and drug and medical complications. See M. Durham & H. Carr, Outpatient
Commitment: The Use of Less Restrictive Alternatives to Civil Commitment (1985) (unpub-
lished manuscript); see also Bachrach, Young Adult Chronic Patients: An Analytical Review of
the Literature, 33 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 189, 192 (1982); Dembo, The Impact of
the Intake Experience on Clients Dropping Out of Treatment at CMHC, 4 J. PSYCHOLOGY,
TREATMENT & EVALUATION 345 (1982); Geller, Rights, Wrongs, and the Dilemma of Coerced
Community Treatment, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1259, 1261 (1986); Miller & Fiddleman,
supra note 17, at 148; Morse, supra note 12, at 85 n.138; Owens, supra note 17, at 31; Willis,
The Many Faces of the Hesitant Patient, 1 PSYCHOTHERAPY PATIENT 37 (1984).
240. Compulsory community treatment is primarily directed to those individuals who are
frequently admitted to inpatient facilities and are sadly burdened with yet another label-
"revolving door patients." Bursten, supra note 17, at 1255; Geller, supra note 239, at 1259;
Editorial, supra note 17, at 1270. In fact, its justification depends heavily on demonstrating
that this cycle can be broken or, as one legislative committee put it, to ensure that "their needs
for rehospitalization will be reduced to near nothing." Owens, supra note 17, at 40 (report of
the North Carolina Mental Health Study Commission). Based on all available empirical evi-
dence, the program is a marked failure in alleviating this problem. Bursten, supra note 17, at
1257 (no reduction in admissions which could be attributed to law); Miller & Fiddleman, supra
note 17, at 149 (new law increased rate of rehospitalization).
241. See generally Morse, supra note 12; Szasz, On the Legitimacy of Psychiatric Power, 14
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 479 (1983).
242. Enhancing the responsiveness of services can only benefit everyone. It may also reduce
the need for involuntary confinement, particularly if early intervention efforts are included.
McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 236, at 48. Morse recognized that quality would increase not
only costs but also demand: "I assume that if fine services were freely available in the commu-
nity, there would be a great demand for such services." Morse, supra note 12, at 87 n.144; see
also Davis, Egri & Caton, Outcomes of Care Systems for Chronic Patients, 76 J. NAT'L MED.
A. 67 (1984); Stein & Diamond, A Program for Difficult to Treat Patients, in THE TRAINING IN
COMMUNITY LIVING MODEL: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (Stein & Test ed. 1985).
Providing treatment on a voluntary basis has always been regarded as the preferred ap-
proach. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). It of-
fers the maximum opportunity for growth and healing, to say nothing of dignity and self-
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If this is impossible or impractical, however, then forcing treatment
remains a potential technique for providing psychiatric care. Coerced
intervention requires enforcement mechanisms and, ideally, compliance
incentives. Whereas commitment to an institution is implemented by a
system of locked doors, regimented living schedules and the lure of in-
creased freedom incorporated in the "privilege" system, court-ordered
outpatient treatment cannot be so easily mandated.243 Even assuming
the public would tolerate the scenario of a disabled person being dragged
through the street to his therapy appointment or day program, there is
probably no one able and willing to do the dragging. Actually forcing
psychiatric treatment is physically difficult, legally questionable and pub-
licly unacceptable.
This obvious obstacle to implementing mandated treatment substan-
tially limits the utility of the model. Only those individuals who are at
least somewhat willing to accept mental health care and comply with
judicially-approved treatment regimens are deemed eligible for outpa-
tient commitment.244 This precondition of cooperation appears remarka-
bly similar to a test of voluntariness. If the model is primarily, if not
esteem. See LRA REPORT, supra note 11, at 351-53; Durham & La Fond, supra note 137, at
432 & n.156; Morse, supra note 12, at 102, and the references cited supra at note 187; Develop-
ments, supra note 7, at 1399 & nn.1, 3-4; Note, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
UnderFlorida'sBakerAct: Procedural Due Process and the Role of the Attorney, 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 508, 524 (1974).
243. There are few effective methods for forcibly imposing the treatment. Locks and physi-
cal restraint have a legacy of punishment but are apparently functionally useful in controlling
people. To date, no one has suggested their transference to community living arrangements or
clinics. The threat of reinstitutuionalization is supposedly the principal leverage to promote
compliance, but its utility is now in substantial doubt. Bursten, supra note 17, at 1257; Miller
& Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 149. Some recognize that little can be done to actually ensure
the treatment but naively suggest that compliance will present little problem. Myers, supra
note 9, at 432-33. Perhaps the most outrageous incident involved a psychiatrist who simply
decided to abrogate the function of the court, circumvent the law, and unilaterally enforce
treatment plans. See Geller, supra note 239, at 1260, 1262. By disregarding the statutory
requirement of imminent dangerousness, the doctor illegally committed, on an involuntary
basis, anyone in his care who refused to cooperate with his medication regimen. Id. at 1261.
For this lawless action, he was commended for his courage in the American Journal of Psychi-
atry. See Editorial, supra note 19, at 1271. Less dramatic statutory subterfuges have been
reported by other psychiatrists. See Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1006
n.92.
244. State statutes or policies usually require client cooperation with proposed community
treatment as a precondition to outpatient commitment. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
540B (Supp. 1984). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-201, 205 (Supp. 1984). See also LRA
REPORT, supra note 11, at 364. Sometimes these same statutes then preclude coerced treat-
ment for individuals who will voluntarily accept it. In re Farrow, 41 N.C. App. 680, 255
S.E.2d 777 (1979). If only compliant individuals will be considered for compulsory treatment,
but client consent vitiates the legal basis (to say nothing of the practical reason) for the coer-
cion, outpatient commitment might be a viable option for a null class.
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exclusively, restricted to those willing to accept mental health care, the
tautology is completed and outpatient commitment is rendered obsolete
before it begins.
Constitutional barriers to compelling compliance also must be ad-
dressed. For potential recipients of outpatient commitment, psycho-
tropic medication is usually a critical component of the prescription for
treatment.245 In fact, it is the reluctance of many individuals to dili-
gently adhere to medication schedules that renders them the most prom-
ising candidates for involuntary community treatment, since this is the
preferred form and most easily implemented method of coerced care. In
an increasing number of states, however, the forcible administration of
these mind-altering drugs requires a compelling state interest to override
the constitutional and/or common-law rights not to be treated except
pursuant to informed consent.246 Where the individual is incapable of
making a meaningful treatment decision-an essential element of com-
mitment pursuant to the parenspatriae authority24 --judicial approval is
245. Psychiatrists forthrightly acknowledge that the most convincing clinical rationale for
involuntary community care is to force resistant patients to take their drugs: "Clinicians argue
that outpatient commitment is ideal for a patient who can be maintained in remission with
medication but who does not take it voluntarily or consistently. They contend that continued
court supervision is justified by the patient's history of repeated psychotic episodes when medi-
cation is discontinued." Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 149. Not surprisingly, the data
which is reported in the medical literature supports the efficacy of judicial orders to follow the
doctor's advice. See id. at 150; see also Geller, supra note 239; Hilday & Goodman, The Least
Restrictive Alternative to Involuntary Hospitalization, Outpatient Commitment Its Use and Ef-
fectiveness, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 81 (1983).
246. The right to refuse psychiatric treatment, as a separate legal entitlement, is of recent
origin and has a questionable future. It was conceived in unique circumstances which blended
fundamental first amendment values with the effects of mind-altering interventions. See Win-
ters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d
744 (D.C. 1979); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct. July 10, 1973), reprinted in 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. RE'. 147, 151-53 (1976). As the
principle emerged into the arena of traditional state hospital practices, it met a less favored
reception. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (1983).
Fortunately for the right and its intended beneficiaries, it was recast into the familiar
doctrine of consent. See Schwartz, Equal Protection in Medication Decisions: Informed Con-
sent, Not Just the Right to Refuse, in THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICATION 74 (1986). There it
thrived. See Rogers v. Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458
N.E.2d 308 (1983); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981); Superin-
tendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); In re K.K.B., 609
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
247. See Hermann, supra note 19, at 102; La Fond, supra note 22, at 527; Myers, supra note
9, at 431. As New York's highest court recently stated: "For the state to invoke [its parens
patriae] interest, 'the individual himself must be incapable of making a competent decision
concerning treatment on his own. Otherwise the very justification for the state's purported
exercise of its parens patriae power-its citizen's inability to care for himself ... would be
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necessary.
Arguably, outpatient commitment procedures could incorporate
this legal requirement of incompetency and the necessary judicial review,
but almost no statutes do so. As a practical matter, few clinicians or
policy makers would endorse such significant limitations on the model.
Its proponents candidly admit that coerced community care is designed
to "abrogate[ ] the right[s] of competent people to refuse treatment." 248
Its effectiveness depends on being able to compel those who resist psychi-
atric interventions-usually psychotropic medication-to follow a pre-
scribed regimen of care; the individual's capacity to appreciate the
options is irrelevant. Thus, the issue is not competency but rather prefer-
ence: when a person chooses not to take the drugs which a psychiatrist
deems necessary, and some form of psychological deterioration is pre-
dicted to follow, coercion is considered desirable.249
Even if outpatient commitment was limited to individuals incapable
of rendering a meaningful treatment decision, in many jurisdictions the
administration of involuntary psychotropic medication can only be sanc-
tioned upon a showing that the person's substituted judgment would be
to accept the treatment.2" For those individuals who have repeatedly
refused to take medication as prescribed-the primary subjects of the
involuntary community treatment proposal-it is doubtful that their sub-
stituted judgment would be to consent to the drugs. 25  Thus, unless out-
missing.'" Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (quoting Rogers
v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980)).
248. Bursten, supra note 17, at 1256. See Geller, supra note 239; Editorial, supra note 19.
249. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 149; see also Geller, supra note 239, at 1260,
1262. It is here that even the legal advocates of outpatient commitment part company with
their clinical counterparts. The law professors insist that a finding of decisionmaking incapac-
ity is a threshold precondition for coerced treatment when it is undertaken for the individual's
own benefit. See supra note 247. In fact, even the leading psychiatric commentators on civil
commitment support this incompetency criteria for state intervention. See A. STONE, supra
note 72; Roth, supra note 72. It would appear that the preference of some clinicians for coer-
cion, regardless of capacity, represents an extreme view, even in the psychiatric community.
See Geller, supra note 239, at 1261.
250. In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750-52 (D.C. 1980); Rogers, 390 Mass. at 498, 458 N.E.2d
at 314-15.
251. A critical factor, if not the prime determinant, of substituted judgment analysis is the
person's expressed preference. Since the principle is designed to illuminate whether an incom-
petent individual would consent to a proposed treatment, were he capable of making an in-
formed decision, any indications of prior assent or refusal to accept care--certainly if rendered
at a time when the person was competent, and even if not-are the best evidence of future
decisions. For individuals who repeatedly refuse to continue taking antipsychotic medication,
there is strong support for the legal assumption that their substituted judgment would be not to
consent to these drugs. This assumption is compelling if the prior refusal was a competent
decision, made while on medication and supposedly benefiting therefrom. Thus forced drug-
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patient commitment statutes are held to invalidate this emerging line of
cases and the legal basis on which they are founded, the primary goal of
coerced community care is probably constitutionally impermissible.
C. The Few People Left to Commit
It is quite possible that only those persons labelled as mentally ill
who are: (1) appropriate for care in existing, available mental health pro-
grams; (2) not presently dangerous; (3) not otherwise diverted from the
involuntary mental health system; (4) compliant with prescribed treat-
ment; and (5) judicially determined to have consented to proposed medi-
cation under a substituted judgment analysis will be eligible for
outpatient commitment. The obvious question is who is left. Is this
group sufficiently large to generate all this legal debate? Would the en-
actment of comprehensive outpatient provisions really benefit many peo-
ple? It is doubtful.
Others have recognized the reality that the practical and legal con-
straints on involuntary community treatment substantially restrict the
class of persons eligible for this beneficent coercion. 52 They have also
noted that, in light of the small number of potential subjects, existing
statutory mechanisms can accomplish the same objectives.2 53 It is only
by ignoring these obstacles, as some naively do,25 4 or by proposing a dra-
matic enlargement of commitment criteria, as all proponents inevitably
must, that outpatient commitment has any real meaning. The proposal
is thus reduced to its true purpose: to expand the circle of involuntary
ging through judicial compulsion may be the most problematic for those individuals who have
documented histories of noncompliance with treatment regimens.
252. The Institute on Mental Disability and the Law of the National Center for State
Courts has observed:
Only a minority of patients-the most severely ill and those most likely to be danger-
ous-penetrate the involuntary civil commitment system to the point of a judicial
hearing .... Even if involuntary outpatient commitment is properly and conscien-
tiously used, it may have limited application because it is, by definition, a part of the
involuntary civil commitment laws and practices and must conform, at least theoreti-
cally, to those laws and practices.
Keilitz, supra note 17, at 38; see also COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 497; Burs-
ten, supra note 17, at 1258; Keilitz, supra note 112, at 732-33; Owens, supra note 17, at 24, 64.
Whatever the precise percentage, it is clear that the number of persons subject to outpa-
tient commitment roughly decreases as the availability and quality of voluntary community
services increases. This is obviously true of responsive prescreening programs, which can di-
vert the majority of those in need of some support or assistance from any form of involuntary
treatment. See COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 427-28; LRA REPORT, supra
note 11, at 338-44.
253. Conditional release can effectively serve the same ends. See COMMITMENT GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 11, at 5 10-11; see also supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
254. Myers, supra note 9, at 432; Editorial, supra note 17.
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commitment, not to shift the locus of compulsory care.255 As such, it
must confront the constitutional challenges to expansive applications of
the parens patriae authority which have prevailed over the past two de-
cades.256 Even more significantly, it must also contrive a mechanism for
ensuring that people with mental disabilities attend programs which usu-
ally do not exist in neighborhoods that will not permit them to develop.
D. The Resistance of Community Mental Health Agencies
Compelling care in community settings depends on the cooperation
and active endorsement of those local agencies which provide the treat-
ment. Service delivery models differ amongst states, ranging from pub-
licly-operated and funded community hospitals or clinics to systems
comprised entirely of private nonprofit providers supported in part by
governmental contracts. This latter model has been the principal ap-
proach encouraged by the federal government for the past two decades,
beginning with the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act
in 1963. 257 Yet there is substantial evidence that these programs have
not been responsive to individuals considered to be seriously mentally
.l 258
The ability to control admissions to and discharges from community
mental health agencies has frequently been noted as a critical problem in
relying on private mental health agencies as alternatives to state-operated
institutions. The freedom to reject potential clients is a treasured option
for most providers which goes to the very core of their stature as an
independent professional corporation. For many, there is neither an or-
ganizational mission nor interest in serving individuals with severe disa-
255. See Appelbaum, Is the Need for Treatment Constitutionally Acceptable as a Basis for
Civil Commitment?, 12 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 144 (1984); Bleicher, supra note 12, at
113-14; Chodoff, supra note 17; Geller, supra note 239, at 1262-63; Hermann, supra note 9, at
100; Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1021-22; Myers, supra note 9, at 427.
A number of states have heeded this call and established a lower standard for involuntary
community treatment than that which governs inpatient commitment. See supra note 20 and
infra Appendix; see also Keilitz, supra note 112, at 720; McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 236, at
61. The research shows these legislative modifications have not been honored nor have they
been successful. See supra note 231.
256. See cases cited supra note 30.
257. The Act was originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282 (1963). It was
recently repealed by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
§ 902(e)(2)(B), 95 Stat. 357, 560 (1981).
258. The failure of the community mental health centers (CMHCs) to fulfill their statutory
mandate is chronicled in E. TORREY & S. WOLFE, supra note 233, at 12-14; see also Goldman,
Regier & Taube, Community Mental Health Centers and the Treatment of Severe Mental Dis-
order, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 83 (1980); Miller, The Community Psychiatrist as Public De-
fender, 16 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 34 (1979).
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bilities-precisely those persons who are traditionally cared for in public
mental hospitals and subject to involuntary commitment. 259 Even more
problematical, the very service delivery principles which underlie com-
munity mental health care are simply inconsistent with forcibly medi-
cating individuals labeled as mentally ill or compelling their attendance
in local treatment programs.26
Nevertheless, community mental health agencies play the pivotal
role in implementing most outpatient commitment schemes. Since the
individual is judicially entrusted to their care, providers must be aware
of, and at least reluctantly assent to, individual commitment petitions.
261
Significant monitoring and enforcement responsibilities are imposed on
these agencies, which they attempt to fulfill through case management
and outreach programs, although occasionally they resort to physical or
mechanical means.262 If noncompliance problems arise, the program
must initiate revocation, modification, or other remedial processes, and
259. Bursten, supra note 17, at 1258; Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150 & n.13. In
their North Carolina study, Miller and Fiddleman determined that the data supported a
sweeping conclusion:
A more significant problem lies in the reluctance of CMHC staff to treat unwill-
ing patients. As indicated by their questionnaire responses and by the authors' previ-
ous study, their attitudes ranged from total rejection of working with committed
patients to strong skepticism concerning the value of outpatient commitment. The
severely and chronically mentally ill, who have the most to gain from outpatient
commitment, are also the most expensive to treat in terms of staff time; outreach
efforts and frequently missed appointments are costly. Many community mental
health clinics continue to view state hospitals as the preferred treatment locus for
such patients rather than accepting the responsibility of providing community based
treatment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
260. The basic philosophy of the community mental health movement has always been
grounded in principles of client choice, social integration, and clinical professionalism. LRA
REPORT, supra note 11, at 365. Whether these goals have been realized is another matter. See
E. TORREY & S. WOLFE, supra note 233, at 12. The nonmedical orientation of many commu-
nity mental health workers has increased the resistance to authoritarian approaches and forced
drugging. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150.
261. A significant statutory reform enacted as part of North Carolina's attempt to improve
the effectiveness of its outpatient commitment law included the requirement that the commu-
nity facility had to participate in the decision to seek involuntary treatment and had to agree it
was the most effective method before a court could order compulsory care. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-273(a)(2) (Supp. 1985); see also Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29,
at 997 n.61. Other states also attempt to mandate the cooperation of local agencies. LRA
REPORT, supra note 11, at 321 (Arizona); Bursten, supra note 17, at 1258 (rennessee). It is
usually of little consequence given the resistance of these agencies to treat committed persons.
See Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150.
262. The few studies concerning outpatient commitment which do exist identify its primary
function as a means to coerce medication. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150. But
presumably it can be applied to compel a person to live in a community residence or to attend
a day program. If treatment compliance is an issue and escape from the facility is a possibility,
the program might seek to lock its doors or employ restraint. California effectively accom-
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prove the relevant facts at judicial or administrative hearings. Where the
agency lacks the capacity to monitor or the will to enforce the commit-
ment order, involuntary outpatient treatment becomes a seldom-invoked
option.
It is quite possible that creative contracting and new program agen-
das could modify some of the longstanding resistance of many mental
health providers to serving the most needy citizens.2z 3 But to require
local agencies to submit to ongoing judicial supervision and to enthusias-
tically participate in commitment proceedings is asking too much. Even
if they could put aside their value-based opposition to compulsory care, it
is unrealistic to expect local providers to willingly assume a host of new
and complex responsibilities. There are simply no incentives, despite a
myriad of disincentives, for local agencies to seek court orders for treat-
ing their clients; to dedicate scarce professional resources to testifying in
court; to be responsible for the ongoing supervision of committed per-
sons; and to report regularly to judges on their clients' progress or lack
thereof.2 4 Not surprisingly, associations of community mental health
agencies are often among the most vocal opponents of outpatient com-
mitment legislation. 65 Without their support, the model is of questiona-
plishes this through its conservatorship commitment of incompetent individuals to locked
nursing facilities. McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 236, at 57-58.
263. Some state mental health agencies require their vendors to agree to a zero-reject sys-
tem and accept all referrals made by district or area mental health offices. Western Massachu-
setts exemplifies this approach. See infra text accompanying notes 298-324. Other states such
as Pennsylvania have successfully experimented with performance contracting mechanisms,
with premiums awarded for serving more difficult clients. By transferring control to the states
of all federal mental health block grant funds distributed under the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981), Congress offered the states a powerful tool
to reverse the history of a private provider-controlled system.
264. This understandable reluctance has been identified as a critical obstacle to the mean-
ingful utilization of outpatient commitment. See Bursten, supra note 17, at 1258; Miller &
Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150; Owens, supra note 17, at 17, 30. Even its psychiatric propo-
nents lament the time and resources wasted in endless judicial proceedings. Appelbaum, The
Rising Tide of Patients" Rights Advocacy, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 9, 10 (1986);
Editorial, supra note 19.
While the establishment of community programs which are entirely state-operated as well
as publicly-funded might possibly reduce the likelihood of agency resistance to serving certain
clients, it does not address the costs associated with the ongoing supervision of treatment deci-
sions. In order for outpatient commitment to function effectively, this supervision must be
extensive. A national task force of clinical and legal experts recommended that outpatient
treatment plans, comprised of at least seven basic elements, must be initially approved by the
court. A hearing must be held at which all relevant professionals and mental health workers
could be subpoenaed to testify, if a party challenges any portion of the plan. COMMITMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 508.
265. Miller & Fiddleman, supra note 17, at 150. "During the task force hearings on the
proposed changes in the North Carolina statutes, the major objections came from CMHC
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ble utility.
E. The Expanded Judicial Role
Even with the reluctant endorsement of community mental health
programs and their clients, outpatient commitment mandates a new role
for the courts. The courts must demonstrate the will to release people
with mental disabilities from institutions and develop a working familiar-
ity with the range of dispositional alternatives. Further, they must exer-
cise the constitutionally questionable authority to order and monitor the
provision of involuntary treatment on an individual basis. Finally, the
courts must discover additional resources to achieve these goals, includ-
ing a capacity to ensure compliance with their orders through personnel
similar to probation officers.
The first of these roles is risky at best. In jurisdictions where a ver-
sion of outpatient commitment is available, studies have demonstrated
that judges are either unfamiliar with the option or unwilling to exercise
it. 66 While the lack of adequate programs may partially explain this
disinclination, the proliferation of community agencies which would re-
sult from the creation of a comprehensive system would make knowledge
of dispositional alternatives even less likely.26 7 Except for a few unusu-
ally interested and courageous judges, there is little reason for courts to
experiment with involuntary community treatment, at least where insti-
tutional confinement is a viable option.
directors who did not want to be forced to treat committed patients." Id. See COMMITMENT
GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 496.
266. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 499; see also Hoffman & Foust, supra
note 113, at 1138 (judges unlikely to commit to community program, even when apparently
appropriate, unless all clinicians agree that institutionalization is unnecessary); McGraw &
Keilitz, supra note 236, at 63; Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1011 n. 14.
267. It is not uncommon for a community mental health system to include a multitude of
models operated by dozens of agencies at geographically dispersed sites. This diversity is fre-
quently cited as the system's greatest strength, since it permits far greater flexibility to respond
to individual client's needs than the institutional approach. But for judges who have been
schooled in inpatient commitment and who justifiably require some showing of the quality of
care and security provided by any alternative, this continuum is confusing at best. See COM-
MITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 499; Chambers, supra note 83, at 1168-77; Hoffman
& Foust, supra note 113, at 1137-38. If that judicial confidence must be developed by an
understanding of and familiarity with the various programmatic options and treatment inter-
ventions which might be included in a commitment order, the educational challenge may be
prohibitive. In the absence of such an effort, there is likely to be disuse or abuse of the process.
See COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 499.
There is also the simple truth that judges are not especially inclined to take risks, particu-
larly with individuals who appear disoriented, regardless of how much information is available
about certain alternatives. See Chambers, supra note 83, at 1123 & 1188-89; Hoffman &
Foust, supra note 113, at 1126.
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Judicial involvement in individual treatment decisions is even more
troubling. The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished judges not to
intrude into the domain of clinical judgment nor to substitute their views
for those of qualified professionals. 268 Unless courts are to routinely de-
fer to the recommendations of petitioning psychiatrists, outpatient com-
mitment proceedings will require judges to assess the merits of each
component of the proposed treatment plan. Unlike traditional inpatient
commitment which involves only two alternatives-confinement or re-
lease-involuntary community care is heralded as a multi-faceted, flexi-
ble device that permits the crafting of an individualized treatment order
including one or several sites, modalities and prescriptions. Moreover,
this process must be repeated periodically, and may well occur even more
frequently if the individual's needs change or if compliance with a treat-
ment regimen becomes an issue.269
Given this possibility of extensive entanglement in individual treat-
ment decisions by the courts, it seems probable that they will simply
adopt the recommendations of the state's experts, making outpatient
commitment primarily a vehicle for enforcing the judgments of profes-
sional caretakers. But even ardent advocates of outpatient commitment
differ widely with respect to the role of judges in formulating and enforc-
ing the details of the individual treatment order. Although the legal
commentators recognize the institutional limitations of the judiciary,
they would generally have courts be fully informed of the details of com-
munity treatment, stopping just shy of reviewing medication dosages.
270
The clinical proponents argue for minimal court oversight, decrying ex-
ternal review of their authority and applauding defiant, self-initiated ac-
268. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607
(1979).
269. The appeal of outpatient commitment is arguably its individualization. Rather than
judicial commitment orders merely identifying the place of confinement, they would, instead,
incorporate entire treatment plans. The plans, and presumably the orders, would be modified
periodically, according to the developing facts in each case. Myers, supra note 9, at 421-22; see
COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 508-10, 512-13.
270. See COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 508. The commentary on the
guidelines notes:
Without an opportunity for review and the possibility of challenge, preparation
of a treatment plan can easily become a meaningless ritual and an additional onerous
task to be performed by overtaxed clinicians, rather than an effective technique for
ensuring that respondents are provided appropriate services. Accordingly, para-
graph (d) urges that the parties be entitled to present evidence supporting or ques-
tioning treatment plans and that the court, if requested, accept the responsibility for
approving, modifying, or ordering revision of the plan.
Id. at 509.
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tion.2 7' If consensus on this critical issue touches such sensitive,
parochial concerns, then consistent application or implementation is
illusory.
There is little doubt that absent some meaningful compliance-moni-
toring mechanism, the promise of outpatient commitment as a flexible
dispositional option will remain largely unfulfilled. Evidence of the cur-
rent practice in many jurisdictions supports this prediction.272 Commu-
nity agency staff are obviously the primary mechanism for monitoring
compliance with the court's order. But given the resistance of these
agencies and the necessity for the court to ensure the integrity of its own
process, some form of independent judicial supervision is necessary.
273
One alternative would be the appointment of judicial personnel
analagous to probation officers who would be responsible for identifying
compliance issues and regularly reporting to the court.274 The establish-
ment of a new branch of the judicial bureaucracy solely for people la-
beled mentally ill is not likely to engender wide public support. Nor is
the concept of mental health police especially captivating. It is doubtful
that state legislatures would be eager to fund such a system. Yet the
absence of the necessary resources and personnel to oversee outpatient
commitment orders invites disregard and ultimately disrespect for the
model.
F Community Acceptance of Committed Persons
Little data and much speculation exists regarding local community
receptivity to involuntarily committed persons moving next door.
275 Of
271. See Editorial, supra note 19, at 1271 ("We are faced with the prospect of lawyers
overseeing and intervening in patients' day-to-day care.").
272. McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 236, at 64; see also Bursten, supra note 17; Owens,
supra note 17, at 24, 46.
273. There is unanimity among all concerned that, in the absence of effective compliance-
monitoring, modification and revocation mechanisms, "involuntary outpatient commitment is
undistinguishable from outright release and the hope that a respondent would seek outpatient
treatment voluntarily." COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 513 n.8; see also Com-
mitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 996.
There is less agreement about the form this enforcement process should take. The usual
recommendation relies on judicial monitoring. COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at
513; Myers, supra note 9, at 426. A more radical proposal relies on self-initiated and unre-
viewable psychiatric coercion, which in some circles is considered "courageous." Editorial,
supra note 17, at 127.
274. See COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 512-14; Chambers, supra note 83, at
1176-77.
275. Few articles or research studies note any widespread enthusiasm or even reluctant
acceptance for welcoming people labelled as mentally ill next door. COMMITMENT GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 11, at 499; Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29, at 1019 n. 137.
The political reality of confronting neighborhood hostility when new programs attempt to
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course, many of these individuals may already be there, at least in states
like Hawaii and North Carolina which have lowered the standard for
outpatient commitment. Under many of these outpatient commitment
schemes, people labeled mentally ill who could not otherwise be institu-
tionalized and who reside in a variety of private and public settings
would be placed under the supervision of a court and be required to fol-
low a prescribed treatment regimen. It is possible that neighbors and
public officials would even support compulsory psychiatric care, particu-
larly for disabled persons who were provocative, annoying, or simply
unseemly.
Even with an enlargement of commitment criteria, however, invol-
untary community treatment might also result in the commitment to lo-
cal programs of some individuals who would otherwise be confined in
public institutions. This would not remain a secret for long. When citi-
zens realize that this statutory revision-even if promoted in reaction to
prior libertarian reforms-authorizes the discharge to community pro-
grams of mentally ill persons once considered in need of hospitalization,
public opposition is likely." 6
More enlightened attitudes may prevail temporarily, but they are
certain to evaporate after the first committed person fails to comply with
his treatment plan and causes some major disturbance or physical harm.
Increased awareness of the difficulty of compelling compliance with man-
dated treatment programs would only aggravate the reaction.277 While
people labeled mentally ill may not be any more dangerous as a group
than the general population, there is no recent evidence suggesting that
they are decidedly less so. 278 Even the most effective prescreening, com-
bined with a statutory standard limiting the outpatient option to
nondangerous persons, will not and cannot foreclose the possibility of an
inflammatory incident. Such an incident is as certain as the public out-
cry, although it is unclear which will come first.
purchase residential sites is far more poignant and painful than opinion questionnaires
disclose.
276. Neighbors will certainly protest since even the families of committed individuals com-
plain about the release of their own relatives. Commitment in North Carolina, supra note 29,
at 1006 n.93. The public association of craziness and dangerousness is pronounced. Id. at
1018 n.133.
277. The practical obstacles would soon become public knowledge. See supra text accom-
panying notes 238-51.
278. See La Fond, supra note 22, at 510-11 nn.55-59; Commitment in North Carolina, supra
note 29, at 1020 n.138.
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G. The Risk of Liability
Mental health agencies may resist providing involuntary community
treatment primarily for their self-interest, but they are also especially
sensitive to the real risks of liability. Courts have been increasingly will-
ing to award damages against mental health professionals when their ac-
tions are at least partially responsible for or causally related to serious
harm. 27 9 New duties have been formulated in some states.28 ° The courts
have also enunciated more liberal constructions of causation and foresee-
ability.28 l Other areas of medical liability may also have influenced this
surge in psychiatric litigation.282
Disabled persons have invoked traditional causes of action to rem-
edy harm sustained from their caretakers. The recent articulation of
constitutional entitlements to safety, freedom, and a limited right to
treatment for institutionalized persons has resulted in a new wave of mal-
279. The list of possible common law causes of action against psychiatrists is growing stead-
ily. See, e.g., Dick v. Watonwan County, 562 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Minn. 1983) (unnecessary
hospitalization); Clites v. Iowa, 322 N.W.2d 917 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (excessive medication);
Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481 (1983) (negligent release); Zipkin v.
Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1968) (improper relationship with the patient); Clark v. State,
99 A.D.2d 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 170 (App. Div. 1984) (failure to hospitalize); Gunnarson v.
State, 95 A.D.2d 797, 463 N.Y.S.2d 853 (App. Div. 1983) (failure to protect the patient); Bell
v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 A.D.2d 270,456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 1982)
(inadequate evaluation).
280. Most common law claims of negligence are based upon the traditional standard of due
care, although the content of this general duty has evolved for the psychiatric profession. For
instance, the duty to warn third parties of potential harm is a substantial expansion of psychia-
trists' responsibility and liability. The doctrinal development began with Tarasoff v. Regents
of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). It was soon
adopted in other jurisdictions. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. McDougall,
359 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d
693 (1982); Davis v. Lhim, 124 Mich. App. 291, 335 N.W.2d 481 (1983); McIntosh v. Milano,
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (App. Div. 1979); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671
P.2d 230 (1983). For a discussion of the scope of this still-emerging claim, see S. BRAKEL, J.
PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 3, at 582-89.
281. Suicide is an important area where courts are increasingly inclined to impose liability
by finding that the risk was foreseeable and therefore the harm could have been averted. Smith
v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Predicting the danger that will result
from the discharge of a hospital resident is another area where courts are willing to impose
liability. Durflinger v. Artiles, 234 Kan. 484, 673 P.2d 86 (1983). Expanding the duty to warn
beyond identifiable victims to encompass the public at large is perhaps the most startling and
significant dilution of the requirement that the danger be foreseeable. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980); Petersen, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230.
282. The receipt of substantial damage awards for permanent injuries associated with im-
proper medication and torts such as wrongful birth have generated increased knowledge and
interest among lawyers in the negligent care provided to people with handicaps. See Clites,
322 N.W.2d 917 ($800,000 damage award for excessive drugging which resulted in tardive
dyskenesia).
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practice suits.2 83 This is especially true in decisions to discharge or place
on visit status handicapped individuals who subsequently harm others.
284
Even the constitutionally-based preference for placement in a less restric-
tive alternative has not always shielded psychiatrists from liability for
releasing or transferring an institutional resident to a community
program.
Conversely, longstanding doctrines of sovereign immunity and gov-
ernmental policy exceptions to liability have been waived through tort
claims procedures and civil rights statutes. 285 Although the former are
often narrowly drawn and the latter, at least in the federal courts, are
being radically recast to exclude many negligent acts, damage claims pro-
liferate. Whatever remains of legal limitations on financial risk is gener-
ally applicable only to state agencies and employees. This limited
liability rarely extends to private mental health providers, even if they are
performing a governmental function.286
283. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1982); Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp.
1132, 1139-41 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Gann v. Delaware State Hosp., 543 F. Supp. 268, 273-74 (D.
Del. 1982).
284. Pangburn v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985); Durflinger, 234 Kan. 484,
673 P.2d 86. Courts usually recognize a strong public policy in promoting the community
reintegration of people labeled as mentally ill and recognize a potential conflict caused by the
imposition of liability when a release decision is subsequently determined to be unwise. Never-
theless, they often elect to naively assume the conflict will evaporate in light of the generous
impulses of all concerned:
This presupposes, however, that a psychiatrist will put his own interests above those
of his patient. Perhaps the cynical believe that a psychiatrist will refuse to discharge
his patient for fear of incurring liability even though the doctor recognizes that under
medical standards his patient should be released. We refuse to adopt such a view.
Regardless of their potential liability, we believe that psychiatrists will comply in
good faith with the standards of their profession. We cannot agree with defendant
that imposing liability on psychiatrists, under limited conditions, for their patients'
acts will interfere with achieving society's goal of reducing unnecessary hospitaliza-
tion of the mentally ill.
Davis, 124 Mich. App. at 302, 335 N.W.2d at 488.
285. Most states have enacted procedures mirroring the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1982), which abrogate their sovereign immunity and establish a mechanism for com-
pensating victims for the negligent acts of state employees. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 258 (West 1984 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1983). These statutes
usually do not extend to intentionally inflicted injuries or to malicious, bad faith, or grossly
negligent actions of state workers.
The immunity which is granted to public officials for constitutional wrongs is not abso-
lute. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975). In fact, since the constitutional
rights to safety, treatment, freedom from harm and from unnecessary restraint are now clearly
established, even qualified immunity may not be available. Sabo v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp.
1132, 1141 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
286. Whether private physicians are considered state actors for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment is unclear. This question is usually resolved by examining the factual nexus be-
tween the doctor and state agency, the existence of any public duty to provide treatment
through private parties, the common law basis for the doctors' acts, and the existence of state
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A few outpatient commitment statutes contain express provisions
granting immunity to mental health workers for providing involuntary
treatment.287 Most do not. In those states that have limited grants of
immunity, the protection extends only to actions authorized by court or-
der or taken in good faith pursuant to the statutory scheme; it does not
insulate grossly negligent, intentional or unconstitutional acts.288 But
even if the scope of these liability actions is restricted, the risk of litiga-
tion or large damage awards will not be lessened. And the current trend
in state law is not to shift the burden of the occasional but predictable
injury from mental health professionals to the victims through immunity
provisions.
Community clinicians already burdened with escalating malpractice
insurance premiums are not enthusiastic over assuming responsibility for
the involuntary treatment of persons who are not receptive to treatment,
whose compliance cannot be easily monitored and whose behavior can-
not be readily predicted.28 9 Their fears of an increasing price tag for
involuntary community care are exacerbated by predictable judicial deci-
sions holding community clinics29° and psychiatrists291 responsible for
policies or relevant factors which create a special relationship between the government entity
and the clinician. Bin v. Wallis, 619 F. Supp. 481, 491 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (even though com-
munity mental health centers are private, nonprofit organizations, they are sufficiently in-
volved with the provision of public mental health services to be considered state actors);
Willacy v. Lewis, 598 F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C. 1984) (local doctor's emergency commitment to
public mental hospital for evaluation and examination is not state action, but compulsory
transportation may be); Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy Shriver Center for Mental Retardation,
556 F. Supp. 677 (D. Mass. 1983) (state duty to provide medical care to institutionalized
residents); Ruffier v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (where pri-
vate hospital performs public function with respect to confinement, state action exists).
287. North Carolina is the most prominent example. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1220-58 (Supp.
1983). See infra Appendix.
288. Even in North Carolina, with its apparently absolute immunity provision that governs
state hospitals, the courts limited the protection to physicians and excluded grossly negligent
conduct. Pangburn, 73 N.C. App. at 342-43, 326 S.E.2d at 372. The release of a previously
committed individual over his parent's strong objection was enough to constitute gross negli-
gence. The same court noted that the much-heralded outpatient immunity provision affords
less insulation from liability, allowing recovery for any departure from professional standards.
See id. at 347-48, 326 S.E.2d at 372.
289. The medical community is clearly worried. One researcher noted that liability con-
cerns were a major obstacle to the utilization of coerced treatment in three of the five states
surveyed, all of which had recently enacted comprehensive outpatient schemes. Owens, supra
note 17, at 24, 30, 38. The calls for greater flexibility in mandating community treatment are
usually joined with demands for relief from liability risks. See Appelbaum, Civil Rights Liti-
gation and Mental Health: Section 1983, 32 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 305 (1981); Editorial, supra
note 19, at 1270.
290. In Peck v. The Counseling Center of Addison Co., 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985),
the Vermont Supreme Court held that a community mental health agency had a duty to take
appropriate steps to prevent potential harm to identified victims from one of its clients who
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the consequences of their clients' behavior. Even with limited immunity,
outpatient commitment is likely to be expensive, at least to the treaters
and their insurance companies.
H. Expanded Entitlement to Community Services
During the past two decades, courts have regularly held that the
deprivation of freedom through involuntary commitment required the
government to place the person in an environment which least restricted
his liberty.2 92 Impressive arguments have been made that this principle
extends beyond the mere consideration of available settings and encom-
passes the obligation to create alternative programs which equally serve
the state's interests in security and treatment.293 Initially, in the context
of structural reform litigation, these rationales were successful and re-
sulted in the wholesale modifications of entire systems of care. Subse-
quently, the same reasoning was applied to individual commitment cases
to force the establishment of noninstitutional alternatives, at least where
a professional consensus existed that further hospitalization was harmful
or unnecessary.294
The conceptual framework for these developments has always been
grounded in involuntary confinement. Although courts have been in-
creasingly sensitive to the reality that the label of commitment is not the
only measure of involuntariness, some showing of a deprivation of liberty
was being seen on an outpatient basis. A similar conclusion was reached by an Illinois court of
appeals, when a mental health facility failed to control one of its clients whom it knew should
be involuntarily committed. Estate of Johnson v. Village of Libertyville, 146 Ill. App. 3d 834,
496 N.E.2d 1219 (1986); see also Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal. App. 3d 298, 191
Cal. Rptr. 704 (1983).
291. The omnipresent issue of ensuring compliance with prescribed treatment presents even
more demanding liability problems. If courts continue to hold physicians responsible for fail-
ing to hospitalize persons who subsequently harm an unidentified member of the general pub-
lic, as they have already done, then no sensible psychiatrist will assume the risk of
involuntarily treating community clients, or if they do, will quickly reinstitutionalize them
upon even the vaguest indication of some difficulty. Currie v. United States, 111 F.R.D. 56
(M.D.N.C. 1986) (failure to hospitalize allegedly dangerous person, even if there is no identifi-
able victim or specifically known harm, renders psychiatrist liable for resultant injuries); Clark
v. State, 99 A.D.2d 616, 472 N.Y.S.2d 170 (App. Div. 1984) (failure to respond to warnings
from roommate that patient was not taking medication regularly and had missed therapy ap-
pointments was sufficient to find doctor liable for failing to rehospitalize individual); Petersen,
100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (decision not to petition for commitment is not within discre-
tionary act exception to state tort claims act, therefore doctor can be held liable for conse-
quential injuries caused by client in the community).
292. See cases cited supra note 30.
293. See cases cited supra note 115.
294. See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 235 (1986); Thomas
S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986).
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is required. 95 Outpatient commitment schemes would extend this pre-
ferred classification beyond the institutional walls. Statutory reforms
which also include a different (and lower) standard for involuntary com-
munity treatment would substantially expand the numbers of people in
this class. For all of these individuals, new constitutional rights could be
asserted, including, at least, a plausible claim for the appropriate commu-
nity service consistent with professional judgment.2 96 States aware of the
entitlement implication of outpatient commitment might be hesitant to
embark on this path. If public funding for adequate community services
is not available prior to the initiation of an outpatient commitment
model, it may well be compelled by it. Such an indirect reallocation of
resources is likely to be a serious disincentive for legislatures, executive
officials and all but the most conspiratorial of policymakers.
Of course, if involuntary community treatment is to have any practi-
cal significance, the states must first establish the programs to which peo-
ple can be committed. Presumably this common sense chronology will
reduce the threat of compelling funding for compelled treatment. It
might even eliminate the need for all forms of coercion.2 97 However,
since no system of care is ever wholly adequate, there will always be
individual cases where an entitlement to a particular type of alternative
service, founded on the involuntariness of community care, can be
asserted.
VI. THE MASSACHUSETrS MODEL
It is difficult to imagine a jurisdiction where all of these implementa-
tion obstacles have been satisfactorily addressed. But in one region of
Massachusetts, the most critical have been overcome and several others
rendered unnecessary. It is a model not for the successful implementa-
tion of outpatient commitment but for its irrelevance.
Like most other states, Massachusetts revised its mental health stat-
ute in the early 1970's.29S A new civil commitment standard of "danger
295. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1982).
296. See Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595,
632-33 (1983).
297. This was precisely the consequence of creating a comprehensive system of community
services in western Massachusetts, pursuant to a consent decree which provided an entitlement
to care in the least restrictive alternative. For a brief discussion of the consent decree, see
Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F (E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978), reprinted in 3 MENTAL DISA-
BILITY L. REP. 45 (1979), enforced, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982), affid as modified, 786
F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986); see also infra text accompanying notes 298-324.
298. A study commission reviewed statutory reforms in several other jurisdictions and
made recommendations to the legislature. See Walker, Mental Health Law Reform, 53 B.U.L.
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to self or others" replaced the more lenient criteria of "in need of care
and treatment. 2 99 A requirement that a person could not be hospital-
ized unless the institution was the least restrictive alternative was in-
ferred by court decision and subsequently incorporated in regulations
and district court rules.3 ° °
Extensive procedural requirements were established governing
emergency detention, initial commitment and recommitment, and peri-
odic review processes.30 1 Significant substantive rights for institutional
residents were also incorporated into the statutory revision.3"2 The legis-
lation did not provide for outpatient commitment. In fact, trial courts
were explicitly limited to either committing a person to an institution or
releasing him.30 3 However, the statute and subsequent regulations au-
thorized administrative transfers and conditional discharge through sev-
eral classifications of "visit status." 3"
REv. 986 (1973). The commission's proposal was subsequently enacted. 1970 Mass. Acts 888
(codified as amended at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123 (1984)).
299. The statute uses the term "likelihood of serious harm" which is defined as:
(1) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by evi-
dence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm; (2) a substantial
risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of homicidal or
other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable fear of violent
behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3) a very substantial risk of physical
impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence that such per-
son's judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community
and that reasonable provision for his protection is not available in the community.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 1.
300. Gallup v. Alden, 57 Mass. App. Dec. 41 (Dist. Ct. 1975); see also Commonwealth v.
Nassar, 380 Mass. 908, 917-18, 406 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (1980). The Nassar court also held that
the prospective harm must be imminent. 380 Mass. at 916-17, 406 N.E.2d at 1291. The guar-
antee of care in the least restrictive alternative is also reflected in other portions of the statute,
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 4, and in the regulations of the Massachusetts Department of
Mental Health, 104 MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 104, § 3.11 (1985). Even the courts have incorpo-
rated this mandate in their procedural instructions to judges who hear commitment matters.
See DISTRICT COURT STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL PRACTICE § 1:02 (1979).
301. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123, §§ 5, 7, 8, 12.
302. Id. §§ 23-25. These rights include, among others, standards and procedures governing
restraint, the right to refuse shock treatment and lobotomy, privacy, access to visitors and
mail, control of personal property, and a presumption of competency. See also id. ch. I 11,
§ 70E (patients' bill of rights); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 104, §§ 3.00-3.20.
303. Northampton State Hosp. v. Moore, 369 Mass. 957, 336 N.E.2d 856 (1974) (court not
empowered to order community treatment). Massachusetts is unique in being one of only a
few jurisdictions which has no explicit provision or even ambiguous authority for judicially-
ordered community care. See infra Appendix.
304. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 104, § 3.14. Decisions concerning visits are solely within the
discretion of the superintendent. The length of time may vary from eight days to a year. No
standards or procedures govern the revocation or modification of this form of conditional re-
lease, which may create a constitutional infirmity. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
Transfers are governed by MAss. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 3. Some process, although no sub-
stantive guidance, is incorporated in this section.
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The implementation of this new commitment scheme resulted in a
substantial depopulation of state facilities. Between 1970 and 1979, the
census of Massachusetts' public mental hospitals plummeted from nearly
13,000 to roughly 3500.305 This decrease followed an earlier halving of
the hospital census which occurred primarily through the institutional
transferring of almost 8000 elderly persons to nursing homes between
1966 and 1973.306 Few community programs or support services were
established during this period. While some of the released residents went
home to adequate but unsupported living arrangements, others had liter-
ally nowhere to go. Up to this point the Massachusetts model mirrored
the experience in most states.
Despite the enactment in 1966 of a statute which required the Com-
monwealth to create a "comprehensive system of community mental
health and mental retardation services" in each of the state's forty catch-
ment areas,307 little progress was made in implementing this mandate.
Then a federal class action lawsuit was brought to enforce its promise, as
well as that of other federal statutes and constitutional entitlements. The
case was settled two years later by a consent decree in which Massachu-
setts agreed to establish and maintain an adequate number of residential
programs and nonresidential services to meet the individual needs of all
plaintiff class members. 308 The action represented an entitlement for all
current and future residents of the Northampton State Hospital, the pub-
lic institution which served western Massachusetts. The decree specified
in extraordinary detail the number, type, cost and capacity of all services,
with flexibility for modification if circumstances changed or further plan-
ning was necessary. 0 9
305. M. DUKACIS, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IMPROVE SERVICES FOR CHRONICALLY
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS 7 (Final Report of the Mental Health Action Project 1986).
306. Id.
307. Massachusetts drafted its own community mental health legislation to mirror that
passed by the federal government just three years earlier. 1966 Mass. Acts 735 (codified as
amended at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 19 (1984)).
308. See Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F (E.D. Mass. Dec. 6, 1978), reprinted in 3
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 45 (1978), enforced, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982), affid as
modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986). The decree contained a list of principles relevant to the
creation of a community system of care and a set of specific commitments by the state defend-
ants governing the establishment of services. Additional provisions on Individual Service
Plans, program standards, personnel and training, monitoring and evaluation, and hospital
conditions and placement procedures were also incoporated in the decree.
309. Twelve residential and 13 nonresidential program models were designed. Each in-
cluded staffing patterns, utilization projections, unit and program costs, and phase-in expenses.
The number of clients to be served by each model was determined by matching the needs of 47
client clusters, that were derived from individual clinical assessments, with the characteristics
of each program type.
June 1987] 1399
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1329
Eight years later, the system required by the decree was mostly im-
plemented, although several key components have remained unfinished.
Compared to the rest of the Commonwealth, western Massachusetts has
a vastly more developed capability to offer community mental health
care.3 10 The contrast is even more glaring when the focus is narrowed to
services for people with severe or long term mental illness, the class for
whom new programs were established under the decree. Each of the five
catchment areas in this region, with an average population of 150,000
citizens, has a range of staffed residential programs which vary in inten-
sity and flexibility and which serve over 120 persons in small apartment
units. No residence accommodates more than four persons. Many have
special capabilities for assisting elderly persons with medical needs, ado-
lescents and people also labeled mentally retarded or behaviorally chal-
lenging. Each area also has a full complement of nonresidential services,
including a clinical assessment team, service coordinators to develop and
monitor treatment plans, a twenty-four hour mobile crisis intervention
program with at least a six-bed residential shelter for temporary living,
case managers for most clients, vocational training, day treatment, medi-
cation and counselling/therapy services.
The implementation of this system of care has decreased the census
of the state hospital by seventy percent and reduced admissions by more
than fifty percent. Only a few persons with lengths of stay exceeding two
years are still institutionalized at Northampton State Hospital. The cur-
rent system meets virtually all of the relevant measures of comprehen-
siveness described in the literature.3 11 By most accounts, few persons are
still institutionalized in western Massachusetts or are at risk of hospitali-
zation as a result of a lack of an appropriate, less restrictive alternative.
All community services in Massachusetts are purely voluntary.
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the decree and eventually extended
throughout the state require informed consent prior to admission to a
community program. 1 2 Consent is similarly mandated for other non-
310. A coalition of consumers, families, advocates, providers and public union employees
initiated the Massachusetts Equity Project to address this imbalance and attempt to promote
the standard attained in western Massachusetts throughout the Commonwealth. This project
analyzed each of the 35 catchment areas outside of western Massachusetts against the consent
decree standard in five consolidated program configurations. The results were dramatic. The
cost of achieving an equal level of services throughout the state exceeded $154 million. See
Mental Health Services Equity Project: A Report to the Massachusetts State Legislature
(1985).
311. See generally COMMITMENT GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at 421-41; LRA REPORT,
supra note 11, at 329-71; see also Stein & Test, supra note 85.
312. The regulations govern all community mental health programs operated, funded or
otherwise licensed by the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health. They are comprised
1400
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residential care and all medication. 3 ' Protective provisions are included
for persons lacking the capacity to consent.3 14 Significant restrictions ex-
ist on a service provider's ability to discharge a client for noncompliance
with program rules or the expectations of professionals. 315 Finally, ex-
tensive due process regulations have been issued under the decree which
govern the planning, acceptance, delivery and modification of commu-
mity treatment, modeled after the procedures that apply to special educa-
tional plans.31 6
No formal study of this new community service system has ever
been undertaken. However, statistical data and widely held views indi-
cate that outpatient commitment would probably produce little, if any,
benefit and would likely result in substantial detriments. 3 7 Few inpa-
of four sections: MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 104, § 15.03 (client rights/dignity); id. § 16.00 (indi-
vidual service plans); id. § 17.00 (program standards); and id. § 18.00 (licensing procedures
and enforcement). The client dignity component is extensive. It includes sections on general
principles, civil rights, mistreatment, medication, restraint and seclusion, labor, personal funds
and property, guardianship and protective services, consent, human rights committees, and
program responsibilities with respect to client termination. Id. § 15.03. See Community Resi-
dential Alternatives: New Regulations in Massachusetts, 4 MENTAL DISABILiTY L. REP. 125
(1980).
313. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 104, § 15.03(11)-(12).
314. Id. § 15.03(10). In limited circumstances, where the decision is deemed routine, a
program director may consent on behalf of a client incapable of making an informed decision.
This informal procedure was incorporated so that a temporary guardian need not be appointed
to consent to the release of information necessary for protecting the client's rights or to gain
access to a limited amount of personal funds. Id. §§ 15.03(8)(d)(3), 15.03(9)(b)(6).
315. Id. § 15.04(2)(d)(1)-(5). A person may only be evicted from a program for acting in a
manner which seriously disregards the rights of others. Termination cannot proceed before all
available alternatives have been explored and until the procedures for modification of treat-
ment plans (including notice, meeting, decision, and appeal) have been exhausted, except in
cases of emergencies. Individuals can never be expelled from a program for exercising a right
protected by the regulations including the right to refuse treatment. Id.
316. Id. § 16.00.
317. Clinicians and directors of programs in western Massachusetts concur that involuntary
treatment is both unnecessary and unwise. The executive director of the largest outpatient
clinic in Holyoke, which serves over a thousand individuals at a given time, felt that court-
ordered treatment would complicate the clinic's task, would promote greater client resistance,
and would seriously "damage what we have built" over several years. Interview with Robert
Dranka, Executive Director of Crossroads, Inc., in Holyoke, Massachusetts (Aug. 26, 1986).
The program's success is based upon a flexible approach which emphasizes clinical staff con-
ducting intensive outreach efforts in the community. It is estimated that over 70% of the
current clients initially resisted mental health care but gradually were engaged by the pro-
gram's supportive and respectful efforts. Id.
An administrator of the largest community agency in rural Berkshire County acknowl-
edged that subtle pressure on resistant clients may be useful for encouraging participation in
mental health treatment, but that explicit coercion would be both dysfunctional and even dan-
gerous. Given the absence of any clinical capacity to actually compel treatment or carefully
monitor the effects of coerced care, judicially-ordered interventions would do little more than
create an illusion of control that might be intimidating but not effective. Interview with Ray-
1402 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1329
tient admissions would be diverted if courts could immediately commit
people to crisis shelters.3a8 It is improbable that many current inmates of
the state hospital would be discharged if commitment to a community
residence was an option. 19 Consent decree planners considered and re-
jected this approach several times. Significant licensing and building
code problems,32 combined with the stated opposition of local officials,
budget analysts, service providers, mental health professionals, consum-
ers and the general public foreclosed this model.
Little appears to have been sacrificed in terms of client needs, treat-
ment compliance or humane care by this decision. Conversely, substan-
tial advantages accrue from the offer of purely voluntary services to
people labeled mentally ill. For the most part, they accept the offer will-
ingly; to the extent they do not, the reason can often be traced to
problems in the quality of services provided or to an intimidating atmos-
phere which pervades the program. Of course, some individuals with
mond P. Brien, Executive Director of the Berkshire Mental Health Center, in Pittsfield, Mas-
sachusetts (Aug. 18, 1986).
318. Several clinicians who directed prescreening programs indicated that the only advan-
tage of involuntary treatment is the ability to serve persons currently dangerous and totally
unwilling to accept care. All others presently are assisted by voluntary crisis programs, which
respond to over 1300 calls per month and see over 200 individuals every month in each of the
five catchment areas in western Massachusetts. Given the risk that a person may escape, it is
not clear that local communities would accept court-ordered involuntary commitments to cri-
sis shelters. Building and licensing code issues would also complicate the program's structure.
Interview with Barbara Stefferud, Clinical Director, and Paul Wagner, Executive Director,
Mt. Tom Institute, in Holyoke, Massachusetts (Aug. 22, 1986).
319. Residential agency directors could not identify a single person at the Northampton
State Hospital for whom involuntary treatment would make a significant difference in the
program's capability to provide care. On the contrary, they saw an inverse relationship be-
tween the degree of coercion and the probability of successful integration into the community.
Interview with Susan Stubbs, Executive Director, and George Fleischner, Program Director,
Valley Programs, Inc., in Northampton, Massachusetts (Aug. 18, 1986). As one administrator
stated, "The point is to create good programs rather than to commit people to bad ones." Id.
(quoting George Fleischner).
Most agency staff agreed that if there were any theoretical benefits of compulsory commu-
nity care, these were limited to a very small number of clients (less than five percent) and
presented almost impossible monitoring problems. Interview with Majorie Cohan, Clinical
Director of Meridian Associates, in Pittsfield, Massachusetts (Aug. 18, 1986). Nevertheless,
despite the unavailability of outpatient commitment for over six years, the director felt that no
clients served by the program would have avoided hospitalization if involuntary community
treatment was an option. Id.
320. The costs of safety are rarely considered when outpatient commitment proposals are
discussed. For a person to be involuntarily committed to a community program, the facility
may need to meet especially restrictive building and fire codes. In Massachusetts, compliance
with these standards would be prohibitive since they require institutional construction and
elaborate fire protections. The benefits of small homes would be sacrificed to the design fea-
tures of hospitals and similar facilities, thereby reinforcing the environmental transference of
involuntary psychiatric treatment.
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serious disabilities will still have nothing to do with this limited system of
care. Several might well benefit from support and structured opportuni-
ties, but few if any would qualify as compliant under outpatient commit-
ment criteria.32 1 Thus, a compulsory treatment scheme would affect
almost no one in western Massachusetts. Instead, it would convert an
unconditioned offer of support into a judicially-managed regimen of
interference.
Western Massachusetts is hardly the ideal community mental health
system. Problems concerning the capacity, accessibility, quality and in-
dividualization of services abound. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the most
comprehensive system in the nation that serves a large geographic re-
gion.322 By establishing an entitlement to community services and a
range of mental health programs, it addresses the two most critical
problems discussed above.323 By precluding models for involuntary com-
munity treatment, it eliminates the need to overcome the remaining im-
plementation obstacles to outpatient commitment.324 Finally, by offering
only voluntary services, it creates a powerful incentive for handicapped
persons to participate in community programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Outpatient commitment is neither well developed nor well consid-
ered. There is not even a common understanding of its purpose or provi-
sions. To some it suggests a possibility for avoiding unnecessary
institutionalization and providing treatment in more humane, commu-
nity settings. To others it represents an expansion of the state's parens
patriae authority, a return to an era when the perception of a disability
and the professionally determined need for treatment justified compul-
sory clinical intervention. To a few naive observers, it promises a pan-
acea for homelessness, a remedy for the failures of deinstitutionalization
and a means to save the stubborn resisters of psychiatric treatment.
321. Compliant, at least under most state statutes, means willing to participate in commu-
nity services. See supra note 244. In practice, it may mean urged, pressured or cajoled to
participate under the informal but not so subtle threat of rehospitalization. Where the pres-
sure becomes an actual threat of reinstitutionalization and the consequential involuntary ad-
mission contravenes statutory standards, then this indirect approach to compulsory treatment
becomes a lawless abuse of due process. This appears to be the approach adopted by a psychia-
trist who invented his own outpatient commitment scheme in western Massachusetts. See
Geller, supra note 239.
322. See Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882 (D. Mass. 1981); see also Okin, Brewster v.
Dukakis: Developing Community Services Through Use of a Consent Decree, 141 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 786 (1984).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 233-37 & 292-97.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 238-97.
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Outpatient commitment is not a legally justified expression of the
parenspatriae power because it is not limited to the historical purpose of
protecting the physical safety or property of incompetent persons. Nor is
it consistent with the least restrictive alternative principle, since it sanc-
tions rather than curtails the deprivation of individual liberty. Shifting
the locus where the government restricts the fundamental guarantees of
physical freedom, choice and privacy neither legitimizes the deprivation
nor creates a compelling justification for a particular form of coercion.
Outpatient commitment is not feasible. A host of obstacles, most
notably the lack of appropriate community mental health programs to
provide the court-ordered care, preclude its effective implementation. At
best it is a questionable theory in search of a feasibility plan.
Outpatient commitment is not necessary. Existing provisions for
administrative discharge and transfer to community services provide suf-
ficient flexibility to respond to the few cases in which involuntary com-
munity treatment of committed persons might have a significant benefit.
In areas where community mental health services are provided respon-
sively, accessibly, adequately and voluntarily, a scheme for compelling
treatment is superfluous and potentially harmful. The system of care re-
cently established in western Massachusetts demonstrates that quality
services, not forced treatment, is the most promising solution to the cur-
rent mental health crisis.
Finally, outpatient commitment is primarily a guise for substantially
modifying the criteria for state-imposed psychiatric intervention. The
creation of a dual standard for institutional and community commitment
is a disfavored approach which raises grave constitutional objections.
Although a lower threshold for forced community care may answer some
of the practical issues of necessity, this rationale multiplies rather than
limits the conceptual problems. Yet absent a more lenient community
commitment standard, few, if any, people will likely qualify for the be-
neficence of this new form of coercion. With most of the public attention
and clinical fervor directed not to the myriad of implementation obsta-
cles, but rather to the renewed possibility of forcibly treating those who
present no immediate physical danger to anyone, it is beyond dispute
that the true lure of outpatient commitment is not how or where, but
who. Ultimately, it is an attempt to make things better which can only
make matters worse.
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